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INTRODUCTION
To those familiar with disability discrimination law, the basic
standard is well-rehearsed: in order to establish the existence of a
disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the
plaintiff must prove that she has an impairment that substantially
1
limits a major life activity.
“Substantially limits” is a stringent
threshold, with courts (including the United States Supreme Court)
insisting that only a narrow set of deserving cases qualify for
2
protection. Each case requires an individualized determination of
3
whether the disability threshold is met. The case reporters are
replete with opinions finding the plaintiff failed to meet the
4
substantial limitation threshold.
But one aspect of this standard has been largely ignored by both
scholars and, it would seem, ADA plaintiffs’ counsel. The ADA
regulations define substantial limitation by comparison to “the
5
average person in the general population.” While a lot of attention
1. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000).
2. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 196–97 (2002)
(reasoning that the use of the term “substantial” indicates an impairment that
interferes in a minor way will not qualify as a disability); Sutton v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482-83 (1999) (interpreting the ADA to exclude protection of
individuals whose impairments can be controlled by medication or other mitigating
measures).
3. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483.
4. See Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants,
34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 119 & nn.107–12, 120–26 (1999) (finding that courts
are deciding ADA cases on summary judgment because the plaintiff has failed to
prove, among other issues, that the impairment at issue substantially limits a major
life activity).
5. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1) (2007).
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has been paid to the concept of “substantial,” considerably less has
been paid to the concept of the “average person.” Most academic
commentary on the ADA glosses over the “average person”
6
requirement entirely. A number of court decisions suggest plaintiffs’
counsel have done the same, only to have their clients’ cases
7
dismissed for failure to present sufficient evidence.
In many of those cases, plaintiffs were required to present
comparative evidence to establish how the average person is able to
perform the relevant major life activity and how the plaintiff’s ability
8
varies from that average. There is another line of cases, however, in
which courts determine that “average person” comparative evidence
is not required; the finders of fact can instead rely on “common sense
and their own life experience” to determine if the plaintiff’s
9
impairment is substantially limiting.
Courts characterize the
10
disabilities in the latter cases as plain “on their face.”

6. See, e.g., Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under Federal AntiDiscrimination Law: What Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About It?, 21
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 147–54 (2000) (criticizing a decade of court
interpretation of “substantially limits” without any discussion of the “average person”
standard). The difficulties of comparing an individual to an average person have
recently been raised in the context of learning disability ADA claims. See Sara N.
Barker, A False Sense of Security: Is Protection for Employees with Learning Disabilities Under
the Americans with Disabilities Act Merely an Illusion?, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 325, 340
(2007) (reasoning that individuals with learning disabilities are disadvantaged by the
comparison to the “average person” because they may statistically have average to
superior intelligence and the substantial limitation inquiry does not look at the
discrepancy between their ability and achievement).
7. See infra Part III.C.1 (detailing various decisions that rule as a matter of law
that certain lifting restrictions are not substantial when the plaintiff does not present
comparative evidence of the average person’s lifting ability).
8. See, e.g., Lusk v. Ryder Integrated Logistics, 238 F.3d 1237, 1240–41 (10th Cir.
2001) (dismissing the plaintiff’s claim because he failed to produce evidence
comparing his restricted lifting ability to the lifting ability of the general population);
see also infra Part III.C.1 (describing the lack of a clear standard for the applicability
of comparative evidence).
9. See, e.g., Hayes v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 17 F. App’x 317, 321 (6th Cir.
2001) (allowing finder of fact to use “[c]ommon sense and life experiences” to
determine if plaintiff was “significantly restricted as compared to the average
person”); Lowe v. Angelo’s Italian Foods, Inc., 87 F.3d 1170, 1174 (10th Cir. 1996)
(finding that “lifting is a major life activity” and that evidence comparing the
plaintiff’s ability to lift with that of an average person was unnecessary to survive a
motion for summary judgment); see also infra Part III.B (presenting cases where
courts have not required comparative evidence).
10. See Lusk, 238 F.3d at 1240 (noting that comparative evidence is not necessary
to defeat “a motion for summary judgment where the impairment appears
substantially limiting on its face”); see also infra Part III.B (positing that there is little
question that an impairment is substantially limiting in cases where courts rely on
common sense and life experiences).
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The best illustrations of this evidentiary dichotomy are the cases
11
involving impairment of basic motor skills, such as lifting. Plaintiffs
who have “simple” lifting restrictions (generally, lifting weight limits
related to a back injury) have had a more difficult time with the
evidentiary standards than others whose similar lifting restrictions are
12
related to other conditions (such as a non-functioning limb).
Although sometimes couched in factual terms of the plaintiff
presenting inadequate comparative evidence, courts go even further
in lifting cases to rule that certain weight limitations are not
13
substantial as a matter of law. In these cases, the “average person”
standard is used more as a means to an end rather than as a well14
grounded substantive standard. No consistent doctrine emerges as
to when the plaintiff can expect common sense to carry the day and
when the plaintiff needs to present comparative evidence. Plaintiffs
may find themselves uncertain whether they can rely on their own or
other lay testimony (such as a family member), whether simply
supplementing their testimony with that of a treating medical or
rehabilitation expert will be sufficient, or whether more detailed
15
scientific proof of “average” is required.
11. Perhaps this is because lifting restrictions are most commonly tied to back
impairments, which made up the second most common specific impairment alleged
in Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) filings in 2006 and the
most common specific impairment alleged overall from 1997-2006. See EEOC, ADA
Charge Data by Impairments/Bases–Receipts, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/adareceipts.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2007) (stating that “Orthopedic and Structural
Impairments of the Back” accounted for 12.8% of impairments alleged from 19962006).
12. See Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Serv., Inc., 283 F.3d 11, 23 (1st Cir. 2002)
(finding prior cases dismissing lifting disability claims inapposite because “[a]
missing hand is a more profound impairment than a simple inability to lift objects
over a certain weight”).
13. See Williams v. Channel Master Satellite Sys., Inc., 101 F.3d 346, 349 (4th Cir.
1996) (holding as a matter of law that a twenty-five pound lifting restriction is not
substantially limiting on the “ability to lift, work, or perform any other major life
activity” compared to an average person’s ability); see also Velarde v. Associated Reg’l
& Univ. Pathologists, 61 F. App’x 627, 630 (10th Cir. 2003) (suggesting “there is a
threshold of severity of impairment”); infra Part III.C.1 (contending that some courts
rely on generalized conclusions about certain impairments instead of using
individualized assessment).
14. Professor Chai R. Feldblum has suggested that the substantial limitation
analysis in general “often seem[s] to depend more on the court’s belief in the merits
of the plaintiff’s underlying claim than on the specific effects of the plaintiff’s
impairment on his or her life.” Feldblum, supra note 6, at 150. She posits that courts
first developed their restrictive views in response to cases with flawed merits and then
were forced to apply that precedent even to meritorious claims. Id. at 151. In the
cases discussed in this Article, courts have in effect increased the difficulty of proving
substantial limitation by imposing additional evidentiary burdens, suggesting that the
judicial bias indeed relates to the comparative importance of the underlying
impairment as much as to the merits of the individual’s need for accommodation.
15. One law review article suggests that the lack of success plaintiffs have had in
summary judgment cases can be attributed to plaintiff’s lawyers’ failure to develop
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Another issue is that, instead of comparing the plaintiff’s abilities
to the full range of an average person’s abilities, some courts have
narrowed the inquiry to whether very basic tasks cannot be performed,
16
such as lifting laundry baskets and brushing teeth. This comes from
a misapplication of the standard the Supreme Court articulated in
17
Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams for determining
what tasks make up the categorical major life activity of “performing
18
manual tasks.” The Court held in Toyota that in order for a person
to be substantially limited in the major life activity of performing
manual tasks, the plaintiff must exhibit more than limitations
19
experienced in the workplace.
Rather, the plaintiff must show
substantial impairment of all activities “central to daily life,” including
20
performing “household chores, bathing, and brushing one’s teeth.”
Some courts have generalized this to judge the substantiality of all
21
impairments, even discrete tasks like lifting. This potentially creates
a catch-all “tooth brushing inability” threshold of severity that
substitutes for the average person comparison.
Courts have expressed distaste for becoming “glorified worker’s
22
compensation referees.”
At the same time, whether they are
generalizing Toyota or insisting on evidence of average capability, they
seem to be pushing ADA plaintiffs toward presenting functional
capacity evidence similar to that used to make other types of
impairment determinations. Unfortunately, however, the most
common assessment models used in vocational evaluation such as the
23
Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”)
and Occupational

adequate factual records. See Jeffrey A. Van Detta & Dan R. Gallipeau, Judges and
Juries: Why Are so many ADA Plaintiffs Losing Summary Judgment Motions, and Would they
Fare Better Before a Jury? A Response to Professor Colker, 19 REV. LITIG. 505, 517–18 (2000)
(maintaining that plaintiff’s attorneys mistakenly assume their client’s asserted
limitations are enough to survive a motion for summary judgment; however,
evidence is needed to put the plaintiff’s limitations in context).
16. See infra Part III.C.2.b (describing a judicial trend requiring plaintiffs to
present evidence that the impairment causes an inability to do basic daily tasks
outside of the work setting).
17. 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
18. Id. at 198 (requiring the plaintiff to show limitation in a broad range of daily
activities in order to prove a limitation in the major life activity of performing
manual tasks); see infra Part III.C.2.b (discussing the significance that this decision
has had on evaluating other major life activities).
19. 534 U.S. at 200–01.
20. Id. at 197, 202.
21. See infra notes 202–218 and accompanying text (detailing the application of
the “central to daily life” requirement to lifting impairments).
22. Pedigo v. P.A.M. Transp., Inc., 891 F. Supp. 482, 485–86 (W.D. Ark. 1994),
vacated on other grounds, 60 F.3d 1300 (8th Cir. 1995).
23. See generally EMPLOYMENT & TRAINING ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, DICTIONARY
OF OCCUPATIONAL TITLES (4th ed. 1991) [hereinafter DOT], available at http://www.o
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Information Network Resource Center (“O*NET”), and those used
in medicine such as the American Medical Association’s Guides to the
25
Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (“AMA Guides”), are both more
individual-focused than average-focused and more work task-focused
than daily life task-focused. Courts may, therefore, be wielding the
summary judgment weapon against plaintiffs for failure to produce
evidence that does not exist beyond common life experience and
would not significantly help the fact finder.
Although the ADA’s regulations attempt to spell out a criteriabased definition, “substantial limitation” is ultimately a subjective
26
standard. As Professor Ani B. Satz has recently noted, it is subject to
“social influences on what one recognizes as significant life activities
27
and a ‘substantial limit[ation]’ of those activities.” A judgment call
must be made regarding what is different enough to be a significant
deviation from average human experience. At present, courts are too
willing to assume that they should make that judgment call. They
should recognize that the fact finder is in a better position to make
that call, without demanding unnecessary expert comparative
evidence.
Such an approach is more consistent with the rejection of the
medical (expert) model of disability in favor of the civil rights model.
Demanding expert testimony in ADA cases before the jury is allowed
to determine the substantiality of limitation perpetuates the medical
model’s focus on “individual [medical] pathology [instead of]
externally-imposed barriers that limit a person’s access to all

alj.dol.gov/libdot.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2007) (classifying occupations and
providing task descriptions to facilitate job placement).
24. See generally Occupational Information Network Resource Center,
http://www.onetcenter.org/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2007) [hereinafter O*NET]
(providing occupational information and career exploration resources).
25. See generally AM. MED. ASS’N, GUIDES TO THE EVALUATION OF PERMANENT
IMPAIRMENT (Linda Cocchiarella & Gunnar B.J. Andersson eds., 5th ed. 2001)
[hereinafter AMA GUIDES] (providing extensive medical criteria to assess an
individual’s impairment).
26. If working is the major life activity at issue, arguably, the standard is less
subjective because the regulations incorporate at least some demographic standards
into the determination of substantial limitation. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i)
(2007) (stipulating that the complainant’s ability to work is to be compared to an
individual with “comparable training, skills and abilities”); id. § 1630(j)(3)(ii)
(including geographical data concerning job availability in the factors that may be
considered). Yet, a subjective component remains in the degree of exclusion from
job opportunities that is significant enough to be considered substantial.
27. Ani B. Satz, A Jurisprudence of Dysfunction: On the Role of “Normal Species
Functioning” in Disability Analysis, 6 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 221, 252 (2006)
(alteration in original).
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28

segments of society.” Moreover, demanding specific comparative
evidence in all but the most obvious disability cases leads to
unnecessary reliance on expert testimony (and concomitantly dooms
plaintiffs who have not developed that expert comparative evidence)
29
without a corresponding increase in accuracy of determination. As
this Article discusses, there may be significant issues with expert
comparative evidence under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
30
Inc.
While much can be said about courts’ overly burdensome
evidentiary standards, plaintiffs’ attorneys and medical and vocational
evaluators also need to be more proactive. If the current return-towork evaluation regime does not produce evidence sufficient to
satisfy courts that the plaintiff’s limitations are substantial, then a
new, more ADA-centric evaluation regime needs to be developed.
Part II of this Article considers the ADA’s requirement that
limitations of major life activities be substantial as compared to the
“average person’s” abilities. The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) regulations explicitly articulate a comparison
to an average person, but also suggest that this comparison does not
require a great deal of precision. Using lifting cases as a lens, Part III
then looks at how courts have been approaching the evidentiary
standards for showing substantial limitation. Next, Part IV looks at
certain assessment models used by medical and vocational experts,
specifically the DOT, O*NET, and the AMA Guides. While some
helpful information can be gleaned from these evaluation devices,
they do not necessarily lead to the kind of comparisons that courts
seem to be demanding of plaintiffs. Further, as noted, the nature of
the evidence raises some interesting Daubert issues.
Finally, in Part V, the Article suggests that courts are pushing ADA
cases in a direction that results in over-reliance on expert testimony.
28. See Deirdre M. Smith, Who Says You’re Disabled? The Role of Medical Evidence in
the ADA Definition of Disability, 82 TULANE L. REV. 1 (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript
at 3–4), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=979090.
29. See EEOC v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 243 F.3d 1012, 1021 (7th Cir. 2001) (Wood,
J., dissenting) (questioning what is “gained by having vocational experts routinely
appear in ADA cases” when the issue in question is one that can be determined with
generalized information). From a law and economics perspective, one might
question the efficacy of imposing the direct cost of producing expert testimony
considering it is unlikely to decrease the error costs of an erroneous determination.
Cf. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial
Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 448 (1973) (articulating a goal of legal
procedure as “minimiz[ing] the sum of error costs and of the direct costs”).
30. 509 U.S. 579, 593–94 (1993) (articulating the standard for the admissibility of
expert scientific testimony); see infra Part IV.C (explaining the issues that can arise
when presenting expert testimony to establish a substantial limitation).
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Jury common sense should be used most frequently to evaluate the
evidence presented in ADA cases. If common sense does not prevail,
however, plaintiffs’ counsel in conjunction with medical and
vocational experts need to use the “average person” standard
proactively, which may be one way to decrease the number of ADA
cases dismissed on summary judgment.
I.

THE ADA REQUIRES AN INDIVIDUALIZED ASSESSMENT OF
DISABILITY AS COMPARED TO AN “AVERAGE” PERSON

In order to proceed under the ADA, the plaintiff must first meet
31
the threshold requirement that she have a disability.
This
determination must result from an individualized assessment of the
plaintiff’s impairment and the restrictions that arise from that
32
impairment.
As set out in the EEOC’s regulations, the general
benchmark for whether restrictions substantially limit a major life
33
activity is the “average person in the general population.” As this
Part will establish, at least under the legislative history of and
interpretive guidance to the statute, this “average” person is not
based on a scientifically precise calculation, which would presumably
need to be supplied by an expert witness, but rather on commonly
understood human capabilities.
“Disability” is a term of art under the ADA. The statute defines the
term to mean “with respect to an individual (A) a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or
34
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.”
EEOC
35
regulations further define each of these component parts. Most
31. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000) (prohibiting discrimination against “a
qualified individual with a disability”); id. § 12102(2) (defining the term “disability”).
32. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 483 (1999) (reasoning that
“whether a person has a disability under the ADA is an individualized inquiry”).
33. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) (2007). The regulations provide a more specific
benchmark for claims involving “the major life activity of working,” requiring
comparison not to the average person but to a person of “comparable training, skills
and abilities.” Id. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
35. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)–(j). “Physical or mental impairment” is defined
broadly to include any physiological disorder or condition that affects one or more
body systems such as neurological, musculoskeletal, or cardiovascular, or a mental or
psychological disorder such as mental retardation or emotional or mental illness. Id.
§ 1630.2(h). “Major [l]ife [a]ctivities” are defined to include “functions such as
caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
breathing, learning, and working.” Id. § 1630.2(i). The EEOC’s authority to issue
regulations defining the generally applicable provisions of the ADA, as opposed to
the employment provisions of Title I, is an open question. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 479
(suggesting, without deciding, that the EEOC might not have been given such
authority).
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pertinently, “substantially limits” is defined by comparison to the
“average” person:
(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person
in the general population can perform; or
(ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration
under which an individual can perform a particular major life
activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under
which the average person in the general population can perform
36
that same major life activity.

The regulations then list three general factors to consider in
making this determination: “(i) The nature and severity of the
impairment; (ii) The duration or expected duration of the
impairment; and (iii) The permanent or long term impact, or the
expected permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the
37
impairment.”
The regulations’ reference to the “average person in the general
population” is similar to what was articulated in the House Report
addressing ADA legislation, which distinguished between
“substantial” and “trivial” impairments as follows:
A person with minor, trivial impairment, such as a simple infected
finger, is not impaired in a major life activity. A person is
considered an individual with a disability for purposes of the first
prong of the definition when the individual’s important life
activities are restricted as to the conditions, manner, or duration
under which they can be performed in comparison to most
38
people.

The House Report gives the following example: “A person who
can walk for 10 miles continuously is not substantially limited in
walking merely because on the eleventh mile, he or she begins to
experience pain because most people would not be able to walk
39
eleven miles without experiencing some discomfort.” This is the
extent to which “average” is considered in the legislative history of
the ADA. The non-scientific language in the legislative history
suggests that a finding of substantial limitation can be based on a
common sense understanding of what is different from most people’s

36. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1). The regulations establish two sets of factors for
evaluating the limitation at issue, one set of general factors and one set more specific
to the major life activity of working. Id. § 1630.2(j)(2)–(3).
37. Id. § 1630.2(j)(2).
38. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
303, 334.
39. Id.
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experience. It certainly does not suggest that Congress had an
exacting standard in mind.
Nor is there any support for an exacting standard in the
Rehabilitation Act, whose section 504 regulations were used as a
40
model for the ADA’s statutory definition of disability. In fact, those
41
As
regulations did not specifically define “substantially limited.”
Professor Chai Feldblum, one of the drafters of the ADA, notes, very
few Rehabilitation Act cases had raised issue as to what was
substantial, and the ADA’s drafters did not anticipate that their use of
the same three prong definition of disability would result in the
demanding standards courts have imposed on plaintiffs to prove their
42
impairments are substantially limiting.
Accordingly, nothing in the Act’s history suggests that expert
testimony generally would be required on the issue of average and
the degree to which the individual varies from that average.
Consistent with that, neither the EEOC’s Title I regulations nor the
EEOC’s interpretive materials require such testimony, except perhaps
43
in cases involving the major life activity of working. Rather, they
40. Feldblum, supra note 6, at 92.
41. See 34 C.F.R. § 104.3 (2007) (referring to, but failing to expressly define, the
term substantial limitation when defining other terms used in section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act); see also Equal Employment Opportunity for Individuals with
Disabilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,726 (July 26, 1991) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630)
(noting that Congress directed that the ADA regulations be modeled upon 34 C.F.R.
pt. 104 and that the EEOC regulations “define[] terms not previously defined in
[those] regulations . . . such as ‘substantially limits’”). The Department of Labor’s
(“DOL”) section 504 regulations, which apply to entities receiving federal financial
assistance from the DOL, define “substantially limits,” but only by reference to
employability:
Substantially limits means the degree that the impairment affects an
individual becoming a beneficiary of a program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance or affects an individual’s employability. A handicapped
individual who is likely to experience difficulty in securing or retaining
benefits or in securing, or retaining, or advancing in employment could be
considered substantially limited.
29 C.F.R. § 32.3 (2006).
42. Feldblum, supra note 6, at 92–94.
43. Nothing in the Title I regulations addresses what “average person in the
general population” means. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630 (2007) (defining many terms but
not elaborating an average person standard). The guidance does, however, set out
some additional evidentiary standards for the major life activity of working. See infra
notes 49–50 and accompanying text (elaborating on the guidance provided for
establishing a work impairment). Additional sources of interpretive guidance,
likewise, fail to establish exacting scientific standards. See generally EEOC, A
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL ON THE EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS (TITLE I) OF THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (1992) [hereinafter TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
MANUAL] (providing guidance intended to assist the public with applying ADA
standards); EEOC, EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 902 (1995) [hereinafter
COMPLIANCE MANUAL], available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/902cm.html
(offering guidance to EEOC field investigators who are determining whether and
how to proceed with an ADA charge).
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suggest that individualized evidence of the plaintiff’s restrictions
should usually be sufficient to make a determination, such that most
cases will be resolved by reference to some kind of commonly
44
understood average.
For example, Section 902 of the EEOC Compliance Manual
(“Compliance Manual”) focuses on gathering information from the
charging party and his doctor, family, friends, and rehabilitation and
other counselors about the individual’s impairment and its impact on
45
The enforcement guidance specific to
the individual’s life.
psychiatric disabilities takes a similar approach, explicitly stating that
“[e]xpert testimony about substantial limitation is not necessarily
46
required.” The examples used in these sources demonstrate that
conclusions can be drawn directly from the nature of the plaintiff’s
restrictions. The Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“Interpretive Guidance”) uses the example of a person
“who, because of an impairment, can only walk for very brief periods
of time” to illustrate a significant restriction compared to the average
47
person. Similarly, the Compliance Manual’s examples draw contrasts
44. When the interpretive appendix to 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) was first published,
it specifically provided that “the term ‘average person’ is not intended to imply a
precise mathematical ‘average.’” 56 Fed. Reg. 35,726-01 (July 26, 1991) (codified at
29 C.F.R. pt 1630 app. 1630.2(j)). After the Supreme Court’s decision in Sutton v.
United Airlines, Inc. 527 U.S. 471 (1999), the EEOC amended the Appendix to
remove text it characterized as “address[ing] mitigating measures used by persons
with impairments.” 65 Fed. Reg. 36,327 (June 8, 2000). Although that sentence
arguably had no direct relationship to mitigating measures, it was at the end of a
paragraph right after two examples that were superseded by the Sutton ruling, and
the paragraph was amended to remove all of that text. 56 Fed. Reg. 35726-01 (July
26, 1991) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt 1630 app. 1630.2(j)).
45. COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 43, § 902.4(c)(1). According to the
Compliance Manual, “a good starting point for determining the extent to which a
physical or mental impairment limits any of the charging party’s major life activities”
is the medical documentation submitted by the charging party. Id. The Compliance
Manual accordingly suggests that investigators should request the charging party
provide copies of any medical statements that describe the party’s restrictions. Id.
The guidance cautions investigators not to stop there:
[I]t is essential that the investigator obtain a statement in which the charging
party describes the nature of his/her condition and explains how the
condition limits his/her performance of major life activities. In addition,
the investigator should obtain statements from other persons who have
direct knowledge of the individual’s restrictions. For example, persons such
as friends and family members, supervisors, rehabilitation counselors, and
occupational or physical therapists may be able to describe the restrictions
that the individual’s impairment places on the individual. Further, the
investigator’s own observations of the charging party may supply or confirm
information about the charging party’s restrictions.
Id.
46. EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND
PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES 6 (1997), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/psy
ch.html.
47. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j).
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based on common understanding of a significant restriction
compared to the average person:
Example 1: [Charging Party (“CP”)] has a mild form of Type II,
non-insulin-dependent diabetes. She does not need to take insulin
or other medication, and her physician has placed no significant
restrictions on her activities. Instead, her physician simply has
advised CP to maintain a well balanced diet and to reduce her
consumption of foods that are high in sugar or starch. Although
diabetes often substantially limits an individual’s major life
activities, CP’s diabetes does not substantially limit any of her major
life activities. It has only a moderate effect on what she eats, and it
does not restrict her in any other way.
Example 2: Same as Example 1, above, except CP’s condition
requires CP to follow a strict regimen. She must adhere to a
stringent diet, eat meals on a regular schedule, and ensure a
proper balance between her caloric intake and her level of physical
activity. A change of routine, such as a high-calorie meal or
unexpected strenuous exercise, could result in blood-sugar levels
that are dangerously high or low. CP’s condition significantly
restricts how she functions in her day-to-day life. CP, therefore, has
an impairment (diabetes) that substantially limits one or more of
48
her major life activities.

Neither example looks to specific comparative evidence, nor any
expert opinion beyond that of the individual’s treating physician.
The guidance moves somewhat toward requiring expert
comparative testimony for the major life activity of working. The
Interpretive Guidance outlines some types of comparative evidence that
might be used, while at the same time indicating the absence of a
required “onerous evidentiary showing:” “[T]he terms [‘number and
types of jobs,’ in the regulatory definition,] only require the
presentation of evidence of general employment demographics
and/or of recognized occupational classifications that indicate the
approximate number of jobs (e.g., ‘few,’ ‘many,’ ‘most’) from which
49
an individual would be excluded because of an impairment.” The
Compliance Manual adds that when it is clear that a person is excluded
from a class of jobs or broad range of jobs in various classes, only
50
minimal evidence of job demographics is required.

48. COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 43, § 902.4(c)(1).
49. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j). Although not explicit, the reference to “recognized
occupational classifications” suggests the use of the DOT or its successor, O*NET.
Id.; see DOT, supra note 23, at xvii (explaining DOT’s classification system, which
groups jobs into “occupations”).
50. COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 43, § 902.4(c)(3).
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To the extent there is guidance on the issue from the EEOC,
therefore, “average” is not so much a concept of scientific precision
as it is something of common understanding, supplemented by the
plaintiff’s medical record or, in the case of working, general
demographic evidence. If the plaintiff can address limitation in
working by showing exclusion from “‘few,’ ‘many,’ [or] ‘most’” jobs
51
in a class, precision is obviously not required.
Perhaps for related reasons, although the Supreme Court has now
addressed several cases defining “substantial limitation,” none of
them dwell on the concept of “average.” The Court has emphasized
52
that substantial means more than merely different, but has also
suggested that the ADA’s individualized inquiry focuses on the
53
individual’s experience. In Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, the Court
considered what evidence a person with monocular vision would
need to present in order to show substantial limitation. While the
Court rejected finding monocular vision a disability per se, it
nonetheless emphasized that it did not expect ADA plaintiffs to have
54
“an onerous burden in trying to show that they are disabled.” The
Court framed the needed evidence as relating to the individual’s
55
“own experience, as in loss of depth perception and visual field.”
The Court apparently believed that such testimony of the plaintiff
would be sufficient in most cases to persuade the trier of fact that the
56
vision limitation was substantial.
When the legislative history and regulations are taken together
with cases like Kirkingburg, plaintiffs should not need expert
testimony to raise a question of fact on substantial limitation in most
cases, beyond perhaps that of their treating physician addressing the
57
specific nature of the impairment and, in working cases, a vocational
51. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j).
52. See Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 564–65 (1999) (reversing
the lower court’s decision and stating that “[b]y transforming ‘significant restriction’
into ‘difference,’ the court undercut the fundamental statutory requirement”).
53. 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
54. Id. at 566–67.
55. Id. at 567.
56. The Court also noted that it had “brief[ly] examin[ed] . . . some of the
medical literature” which left it “sharing the Government’s judgment that people
with monocular vision ‘ordinarily’ will meet the Act’s definition of disability.” Id.
This appears to be related primarily to identifying monocular vision as a physical
impairment, because the Court immediately went on to state its holding that the
plaintiff must offer evidence that proves the extent of their own experience with the
impairment. See id. (suggesting that evidence about the individual’s experience, for
example, loss in depth perception, could demonstrate substantial limitation).
57. The suggestion that plaintiffs in ADA cases should present medical testimony
regarding their impairments is not without criticism. Professor Deirdre Smith argues
that courts are too demanding in requiring that plaintiffs present medical evidence
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evaluator addressing the categories of jobs from which the plaintiffs
58
are excluded. For some lower courts, however, the “not onerous”
part of the equation has been lost, even in cases alleging vision
59
impairment similar to that in Kirkingburg.
Much of the problem can be traced to another Supreme Court
60
decision, Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams. In
to “corroborate” the fact of their disability. See Smith, supra note 28, at 27 (“Judges’
insistence on the presence of expert medical testimony in the record is based upon
improper reasoning and imposes an unwarranted and inappropriate burden on ADA
plaintiffs.”). She reasons that this perpetuates the plaintiff in the role of patient,
gives purchase to skepticism of individuals with disabilities as malingerers, and
reinforces false notions of the objectivity of medicine. Id. at 66, 68. To the extent
Smith argues courts often require more evidence than necessary to establish the basis
for an impairment claim, there is no disagreement between her position and that
advocated in this Article. In some cases, however, medical testimony may assist the
trier of fact in understanding the nature of an impairment. For example, conditions
that affect internal bodily functions might require some degree of technical
explanation. In all cases, nonetheless, the focus should be on the extent to which
the impairment limits the activities of the individual, which is generally something
individuals should be able to establish through their own testimony.
58. The Eleventh Circuit has said that while expert vocational evidence would be
instructive, it is not required to prove substantial limitation in working. Mullins v.
Crowell, 228 F.3d 1305, 1314 n.18 (11th Cir. 2000).
59. See, e.g., EEOC v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 306 F.3d 794, 803 (9th Cir. 2002)
(holding that two individuals with monocular vision were not substantially limited in
the major life activity of seeing because they did not present sufficient evidence of
activities in their daily life that they were unable to do because of their vision
impairment). Some courts have made working disability cases into a numbers
game—the plaintiff must present specific evidence of the number of jobs available in
the local job market and the number from which they are excluded. See Duncan v.
Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 240 F.3d 1110, 1115–16 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (reversing
jury verdict in plaintiff’s favor because plaintiff did not produce evidence of the
number and types of jobs in the local market from which he was excluded, thus
failing to prove that the total number of jobs that remained available to him was
“sufficiently low that he [wa]s effectively precluded from working in the class or
range” of jobs at issue); Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu Auto., Inc., 141 F.3d 667, 675 (7th
Cir. 1998) (accepting plaintiff’s expert affidavit after it was supplemented to narrow
job availability statistics from entire country to local county level); see also Taylor v.
Fed. Express Corp., 429 F.3d 461, 462–64 (4th Cir. 2005) (finding that the plaintiff
failed to create an issue of fact on his substantial limitation in working where,
although he showed he was precluded from 1,871 of 3,281 job titles [(fifty-seven
percent)] for which he was qualified in the DOT, he could still perform over 1410 job
titles, which represented over 130,000 jobs, in the metropolitan region where he
resided). But see EEOC v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 243 F.3d 1012, 1017–18 (7th Cir.
2001) (rejecting the notion that plaintiffs must calculate the exact percentage of jobs
from which they are excluded, but requiring at least some specific evidence of local
labor market demographics). Some courts go so far as to say that the degree of
exclusion must be at least fifty percent. See Smith v. Quickrete Co., 204 F. Supp. 2d
1003, 1009 (W.D. Ky. 2002) (interpreting Sixth Circuit law to require the plaintiff be
foreclosed from a majority of employment options available to a person with similar
education and skill). In effect, to prove substantial deviation from “average,”
plaintiffs in these courts must prove that they are half as able to work as a similar
person of their education and training. See Heimann v. Roadway Express, Inc., 228 F.
Supp. 2d 886, 902 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (finding twenty-five percent reduction in available
jobs was not a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working).
60. 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
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Toyota, the Court held that an individual who claims substantial
limitation in the major life activity of performing manual tasks must
show that he is limited in tasks central to daily living, not just work61
related manual tasks. The plaintiff in Toyota alleged that she was
62
limited in performing manual tasks by carpal tunnel syndrome. Her
impairment prevented her from repetitive work requiring her to raise
her hands and arms at or above shoulder level for extended periods
63
of time. The Supreme Court sent the case back to the court of
appeals to consider her ability to do other manual tasks it
characterized as central to daily living, such as “household chores,
64
bathing, and brushing [her] teeth.” The Court found that the lower
65
court focused too narrowly on the plaintiff’s work-related tasks.
It is questionable whether Toyota’s “tasks central to daily living”
standard applies beyond defining categorical major life activities like
performing manual tasks. As will be discussed more fully in Part
III.C.2.b, the fact that a task is “central to daily living” arguably
establishes only whether the task is a major life activity, and is not part
66
of the substantiality of limitation analysis.
Because “performing
manual tasks” is not a discrete activity in and of itself, it was not clear
before Toyota what that major life activity entailed.
“Manual tasks” refers to a group of activities, such as “working,”
whereas other major life activities, including breathing, seeing,
hearing, and arguably lifting are, for want of a better term, discrete
67
tasks. That those discrete tasks are considered major life activities
answers the question of whether they are activities central to daily
68
life. Where there is a subset of tasks that make up the major life
activity, however, additional definition of that activity’s parameters is
69
required. This is what the Court articulated in Toyota. The Court
61. See id. at 198 (noting that, in addition to restricting the individual’s daily
activities, “[t]he impairment’s impact must also be permanent or long term”).
62. Id. at 187-88.
63. Id. at 201.
64. Id. at 202.
65. See id. at 201 (“There is also no support in the Act, our previous opinions, or
the regulations for the [c]ourt of [a]ppeals’ idea that the question of whether an
impairment constitutes a disability is to be answered only by analyzing the effect of
the impairment in the workplace.”).
66. Infra notes 221–244 and accompanying text.
67. See Samuel A. Marcosson, Of Square Pegs and Round Holes: The Supreme Court’s
Ongoing “Title VII-ization of the Americans with Disabilities Act,” 8 J. GENDER RACE & JUST.
361, 377 (2004) (suggesting a further distinction can be made between “collective
categories” and “a single, discrete activity”).
68. See Toyota, 534 U.S. at 197 (explaining that because “major,” as used in “major
life activities,” means important, “‘[m]ajor life activities’ thus refers to those activities
that are of central importance to daily life”).
69. See, e.g., id. (highlighting the importance of this distinction and assessing its
implications in terms of the major life activity of performing manual tasks).
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held that a broad-based limitation on performing manual tasks was
necessary in order for that major life activity to be, in effect, major in
70
the same sense as walking, breathing, seeing and hearing.
That these terms need to be interpreted strictly to create a
demanding standard for qualifying as disabled is confirmed by the
first section of the ADA, which lays out the legislative findings and
purposes that motivate the Act. When it enacted the ADA in 1990,
Congress found that “some 43,000,000 Americans have one or
more physical or mental disabilities.” If Congress intended
everyone with a physical impairment that precluded the
performance of some isolated, unimportant, or particularly
difficult manual task to qualify as disabled, the number of disabled
71
Americans would surely have been much higher.

Although the Court in Toyota was addressing only the definition of
the major life activity of performing manual tasks, courts have cited
the Supreme Court’s “demanding standard” language to support a
generally restrictive interpretation of the ADA, including what
evidence the plaintiff needs to show to prove substantial limitation of
72
other major life activities. Depending on the case, plaintiffs may
find that they must present more specific evidence to establish
“average” than the regulations and cases like Kirkingburg might lead
them to believe. As the next Part discusses, only disabilities deemed
“plain on their face” are likely to avoid the comparative evidence
73
requirement.
II. WHEN IS COMPARATIVE EVIDENCE REQUIRED AND WHEN IS
COMMON SENSE ENOUGH?
When considering whether the limitations on a plaintiff’s major
life activity are substantial, some courts have required evidence
explicitly outlining what is “average” and how the plaintiff deviates
74
from that standard. Other courts have suggested that the common
70. See id. (“If each of the tasks included in the major life activity of performing
manual tasks does not independently qualify as a major life activity, then together
they must do so.”).
71. Id. (internal citations omitted).
72. See infra Part III (assessing courts’ varying evidential requirements and
concluding that the requirement should depend on the jury’s ability to comprehend
the impairment).
73. See infra Part III.B (discussing the lower evidentiary standard that plaintiffs
enjoy in “plain on its face” cases).
74. See, e.g., Lusk v. Ryder Integrated Logistics, 238 F.3d 1237, 1241 (10th Cir.
2001) (explaining that the plaintiff’s evidence failed to prove that his impairment
substantially limited his ability to lift as required, in part, because he did not “present
any comparative evidence as to the general population’s lifting capabilities”); see also
Snow v. Ridgeview Med. Ctr., 128 F.3d 1201, 1206 (8th Cir. 1997) (defining a person
with substantial limitations on a major life activity as “an individual unable to
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sense and life experience of the fact finder are sufficient to make the
determination at least in some cases, and the plaintiff need only
present enough evidence to alert the jury to the individualized nature
75
of her limitations. How the line is drawn between those cases where
comparative evidence is required and those where common sense
and life experience is enough is not clear.
When the disability appears obvious to the court, not surprisingly,
that court is more likely to conclude that no particular comparative
evidence is required. In these cases, the limitation may be described
as substantial “on its face,” thereby creating an issue of fact as to the
76
plaintiff’s disability. While it is questionable to argue that detailed
77
comparative evidence should be required in all cases, the
substantive reason for requiring detailed proof in one case but not
another should be reasonably capable of advance determination so as
to avoid summary dismissal for failure to provide a sufficient
evidentiary record. At present, as will be discussed below, the
controlling factor appears to be a judicial disdain of the significance
of certain types of limitations. There has also been a tendency to
engage in bottom line thinking, focusing on the outcome (i.e., the
plaintiff can accomplish certain benchmarks) rather than the process
of achieving that outcome (which may be more challenging to a
78
person with a disability).
perform a basic function that the average person in the general population can
perform”).
75. See Lowe v. Angelo’s Italian Foods, Inc., 87 F.3d 1170, 1174 (10th Cir. 1996)
(finding the plaintiff’s evidence regarding her experience with multiple sclerosis was
sufficient on summary judgment to prove substantial limitation in her ability to lift
and no additional “average person” lifting capability evidence was required);
Whitfield v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 2d 434, 438–39 (D. Del. 1999)
(finding that the plaintiff’s individualized evidence that her impairments were
permanent was sufficient to allow a jury to make an average person comparison
without specific evidence on that issue).
76. See Ward v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1225 (D.N.M. 2001)
(finding the plaintiff’s reaching and lifting impairment “substantially limiting on its
face” and comparative evidence therefore unnecessary because a material issue of
fact had been created).
77. See EEOC v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 243 F.3d 1012, 1021 (7th Cir. 2001) (Wood,
J., dissenting) (suggesting that “nothing [is] gained by having vocational experts
routinely appear in ADA cases solely for the purpose of testifying that a broad range
of jobs require the ability to lift 30 pounds, or the ability to perform repetitive
motions”); cf. Feldblum, supra note 6, at 154 (characterizing the judiciary’s approach
of subjecting every ADA plaintiff to an individualized assessment of whether her
impairment is sufficiently limiting as “unfortunate”).
78. See Nealy v. Patterson Dental Supply, Inc., No. 04-3287, 2005 WL 3132182, at
*4 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 22, 2005) (finding that “[i]ndividuals such as Plaintiff who can
complete the tasks of daily living by relying on healthy limbs or otherwise
compensating for their injuries are not substantially limited in major life activities”).
The Supreme Court’s ruling in the mitigating measures cases lends itself to this sort
of bottom line thinking, by requiring that the individualized assessment of the
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The best case illustrations are those in which the major life activity
79
Lifting case decisions
at issue is a basic motor skill like lifting.
reflect a paucity of comparative evidence. In some cases, courts
dismiss the claim simply because the plaintiff failed to present
80
evidence of average ability.
In others, courts make substantive
assumptions about the significance of what the plaintiff can and
cannot do, regardless of whether the court has comparative evidence
81
on which to base that assumption. For example, courts have been
developing a rule that “mere” lifting restrictions cannot qualify as a
82
disability, except in the most extreme cases.
Evaluating the lifting cases leads to two conflicting propositions.
On the one hand, plaintiffs should develop more expert comparative
plaintiff’s disability be conducted after application of any such mitigating measures.
See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 488 (1999) (concluding that
“disability under the Act is to be determined with reference to corrective measures”).
The Court also suggested, however, that the negative side effects of a corrective
measure might make an impairment substantially limiting. Id. at 484. Finding that a
plaintiff does not have a disability because she is able to “complete” tasks ignores the
fact that the EEOC’s regulations find substantiality of limitation can be found not
only when an individual is totally foreclosed from an activity, but also when it is
significantly more difficult for the individual to accomplish it. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(j)(1)(i)–(ii) (2007) (defining “substantially limits”); see also Emory v.
Astrazeneca Pharm. LP, 401 F.3d 174, 180–81 (3d Cir. 2005) (finding lower court’s
“focus on what [the plaintiff] has managed to achieve misse[d] the mark,” and that
the significant difficulty with which the plaintiff completed tasks should have been
considered).
79. Some might question the significance of cases involving lifting restrictions,
on a theory that such impairments are not all that important among the spectrum of
disabilities that the ADA potentially covers. See Mays v. Principi, 301 F.3d 866, 869–70
(7th Cir. 2002) (suggesting that claim was not significant because it involved only a
back injury that impaired the plaintiff’s lifting abilities). To the contrary, because
lifting is such a basic human activity, like all of the basic motor functions, it provides
a strong lens through which to view the evidentiary burdens imposed under the
ADA. As this Article will argue, it demonstrates how juries are best suited to evaluate
the substantiality of such limitations because the jury reflects a pool of common life
experience against which to judge impact.
80. See, e.g., Bristol v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 281 F.3d 1148, 1161 n.4 (10th Cir.
2002) (finding plaintiff “pointed to no evidence of how much the average person
can lift” and therefore fact finder could not make the comparison required by the
ADA).
81. See, e.g., Smith v. Quikrete Co., Inc., 204 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1008 (W.D. Ky.
2002) (holding that a lifting restriction of twenty-five pounds does not limit an
activity of central importance in daily life).
82. See Olds v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 127 F. App’x 779, 782 (6th Cir. 2005)
(asserting that “the general rule in this circuit is that a weight restriction alone is not
considered a disability under the ADA”); Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Serv., Inc., 283
F.3d 11, 23 (1st Cir. 2002) (distinguishing prior lifting cases finding no disability
because the plaintiff’s impairment, a missing hand, was “a more profound
impairment than a simple inability to lift objects over a certain weight”); Law v. City
of Scottsdale, No. 98-6335, 2000 WL 799742, at *4 (6th Cir. June 15, 2000) (asserting
that “[f]ederal case law supports that a maximum weight restriction is not a disability
as defined by the ADA”); see also Thompson v. Holy Family Hosp., 121 F.3d 537, 540
(9th Cir. 2002) (finding a twenty-five pound lifting restriction not substantial as a
matter of law).
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evidence in an attempt to head off summary judgment dismissals
based on the court’s erroneous assumptions about average lifting
83
ability. On the other hand, what is “average” in regard to a basic
motor skill like lifting is something inherently a matter of common
84
sense and life experience. Not unlike the evidentiary standards for
“reasonable person” in tort cases, the specificity of the evidence
should depend on how necessary it is for a jury to understand the
nature of the impairment and its effect.
This Part first examines when comparative evidence has been
required and when plaintiffs have been allowed to rely on the fact
finder’s common sense as to what is average and whether the plaintiff
85
sufficiently deviates from that definition. The major life activity of
lifting is then examined in some detail, because it starkly illustrates
the difficulties plaintiffs have with courts’ demands for comparative
86
evidence. This Part then concludes by suggesting that the specificity
of the required evidence should depend on how readily a lay jury can
87
understand the nature of the plaintiff’s impairment. In some cases,
this requires plaintiffs to present more evidence and in other cases,
requires courts to recognize that the plaintiff’s claim is sufficient to
support a common sense determination of substantiality.
A. Requiring Comparative Evidence in Every Case
An Eleventh Circuit case is the primary source for the rule that a
plaintiff who fails to present comparative evidence in any case is
vulnerable to summary judgment dismissal. In Maynard v. Pneumatic
88
Products Corp. (Maynard I), the Eleventh Circuit initially held that the
plaintiff’s ADA walking disability claim should be dismissed because
the plaintiff failed to produce evidence of the walking ability of the
89
average person in the general population.
83. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (explaining that courts sometimes
require evidence comparing the plaintiff’s capacities with those of an “average”
person).
84. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (indicating that certain courts have
found evidence of a plaintiff’s individual limitations sufficient for the jury to make a
determination based on common sense and life experience).
85. See infra Part III.A–B (distinguishing courts’ varying approaches with regard
to comparative evidence and “plain on its face” cases, where certain courts require
only evidence about the plaintiff’s individualized limitations).
86. See infra Part III.C (analyzing lifting cases and their implications for “lifting”
as a major life activity).
87. See infra Part III.C.3 (suggesting that a jury can understand basic motor
functions through common life experience, and that additional evidence is only
necessary where the jury requires explanation of a more complicated condition).
88. 233 F.3d 1344 (11th Cir. 2000), vacated on other grounds, 256 F.3d 1259 (2001).
89. See id. at 1347–48 (“Maynard ignores a crucial element of the disability-prong
of the prima facie case: he must demonstrate that he is significantly restricted in the

428

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:409

Maynard alleged that he was unable to walk more than forty to fifty
90
There was
yards without stopping because of a herniated disc.
91
Maynard
apparently little dispute about the impairment itself.
argued that the nature of the limitation was enough to create a fact
92
issue for the jury on substantiality. The court of appeals insisted that
the ADA first required the plaintiff to produce evidence of the
93
abilities of an average person in the population.
Without that
evidence, the court held that the plaintiff failed to make a prima facie
case of disability discrimination. The court explained:
The simple proposition we clarify today—that plaintiffs must
present comparator evidence to demonstrate their substantial
limitations—has been largely overlooked in ADA cases. We take
pains to highlight this obvious and crucial element in a plaintiff’s
prima facie case because a review of ADA caselaw demonstrates that
94
plaintiffs are continually failing to present this necessary evidence.

The court of appeals further criticized other courts for “seemingly
tak[ing] judicial notice of the capabilities of the ‘average person in
95
the general population.’” In support, the court cited from a law
review article that urged plaintiffs’ lawyers to beef up their
96
presentation of the prima facie case. The Eleventh Circuit took the
article’s advice and transformed it into a rule:
We instead endorse the proposition that, “[t]o establish that an
impairment substantially limits a major life activity such as sitting,
standing, or walking, an ADA plaintiff must not merely provide evidence
of her own limitations . . . . The first key is to develop comparative evidence.
Who, then, is the relevant comparator? The EEOC regulations
97
provide that it is ‘the average person in the general population.’”

Finally, the Eleventh Circuit suggested that this comparative
98
evidence need not be reinvented for every case. Rather, case law,

performance of a major life activity ‘as compared to . . . the average person.’”)
(omission in original).
90. Id. at 1345.
91. See id. at 1345, 1347 (describing Maynard’s impairment and explaining that
his employer knew about his condition).
92. See id. at 1349 (rejecting Maynard’s suggestion that the jury determine
whether his impairment constituted a substantial limitation).
93. See id. at 1348–49 (citing more than ten cases for this proposition,
highlighting its importance in ADA cases, and criticizing courts that do not require
such evidence).
94. Id. at 1349.
95. Id.
96. See id. (citing Van Detta & Gallipeau, supra note 15, at 518).
97. Id.
98. See id. at 1350 (explaining that where such evidence has already been
established, for instance in case law, the plaintiff will not be required to reintroduce
comparative evidence).
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regulations, and the EEOC’s interpretive guidance could all serve as
99
sources for determining the degree of deviation from average. Only
when “the necessary comparator evidence is not readily drawn from
such a source” would the plaintiff have to independently develop
100
comparative evidence.
The Eleventh Circuit subsequently reconsidered sua sponte its
decision in Maynard and vacated it, dismissing the plaintiff’s claim
101
instead solely on procedural grounds.
One member of the panel
changed her mind and dissented not only from the procedural
dismissal but also the original decision requiring comparative
102
evidence as part of the prima facie case.
She now found the
decision to dismiss for lack of comparative evidence “simply wrong,”
and instead would have held that “[t]he jury’s good common sense
and life experiences gave them sufficient ability to determine that
Maynard’s impairment” substantially limited a major life activity as
103
compared to the average person.
The status of Maynard’s mandatory comparative evidence
requirement is therefore unclear. Before the circuit vacated the
decision, at least one Florida federal district court cited it
104
authoritatively.
Subsequently, another court suggested the panel
purposefully side-stepped the issue on reconsideration because it
105
desired to disavow its prior decision. Given that the third member
99. See id. (indicating that a court could apply comparative evidence established
in these sources to a plaintiff’s individualized condition).
100. Id.
101. See Maynard v. Pneumatic Prods. Corp. (Maynard II), 256 F.3d 1259, 1261,
1264 (11th Cir. 2001) (affirming the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of
law in Pneumatic’s favor because Maynard did not prove that he timely filed a
discrimination charge with the EEOC). The court specifically noted that because it
was deciding the case on procedural grounds, it was not addressing any alternative
grounds for dismissal. Id. at 1264.
102. See id. at 1266 (Fletcher, J., dissenting) (finding that Maynard’s condition was
so obviously substantially limiting that the court erred in requiring comparative
evidence).
103. Id. The Eleventh Circuit sidestepped the prima facie case issue when it
reconsidered Maynard, leaving the circuit somewhat unclear as to whether
comparative evidence is in fact mandatory in every case. See id. at 1264 (explaining
that the court’s finding on the timeliness issue alone sufficed to decide the case). A
case decided in between the two Maynard opinions relied on the court’s initial
decision to dismiss a plaintiff’s ADA claim because the plaintiff “failed to provide any
evidence whatsoever of how well the general population performs any major life
activities in questions [sic] with respect to either his claims for learning disabilities or
obesity.” West v. Town of Jupiter Island, 146 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1301 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
104. See West, 146 F. Supp. 2d at 1301 (citing Maynard I, 233 F.3d 1344 (11th Cir.
2000), for proposition that “an ADA plaintiff must present ‘some evidence of how
well the average person in the general population performs the major life activity in
question’”).
105. See Crutcher v. Mobile Hous. Bd., No. 04-0499, 2005 WL 2675207, at *10
(S.D. Ala. Oct. 20, 2005) (suggesting that “Maynard II took pains to affirm the lower
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of the Maynard panel dissented explicitly to disavow the comparative
106
however, this interpretation seems unlikely.
evidence ruling,
Another recent Florida federal district court concluded comparative
evidence “is not necessary where a reasonable jury could base its
107
decision on its own life experiences.”
Until the Eleventh Circuit explicitly considers the position it took
in Maynard, the issue remains open in that circuit. At present, no
other circuit has pronounced a similar universal requirement. There
is, however, a tendency in at least some cases to treat comparative
evidence as mandatory, at least where the evidence of disability is not
108
“plain on its face.”
This case-by-case approach is discussed in the
next section.
B. Allowing the Fact Finder to Use Common Sense and Life Experience but
only in some Cases
Rather than requiring comparative evidence as part of every prima
facie case, most courts to consider the issue require it only where the
109
disability is not plain “on its face.” In the “plain on its face” cases,
the plaintiff need only present testimony regarding the limitations he
has individually experienced in order to get beyond the prima facie
110
stage. The fact finder is permitted to rely on “common sense and
court’s ruling on timeliness grounds so as to sidestep the issue of whether the
plaintiff met the disability threshold”).
106. Maynard II, 256 F.3d at 1266 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
107. Reis v. Universal City Dev. Partners, Ltd., 442 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1246 n.6
(M.D. Fla. 2006) (noting that while comparative evidence is not necessary, in that
case it would have been useful for plaintiff in order to show her limitations regarding
temperature exposure due to a congenital heart condition were substantial
compared to average).
108. See infra Part III.B (providing case law examples of comparative evidence
requirements where a plaintiff’s disability is not plain on its face).
109. See Lusk v. Ryder Integrated Logistics, 238 F.3d 1237, 1240–41 (10th Cir.
2001) (concluding that “comparative evidence is not required as a matter of law . . .
where the impairment appears substantially limiting on its face”); Crutcher, 2005 WL
2675207, at *11 (concluding that the plaintiff’s impairment appeared “substantially
limiting on its face,” so no comparative evidence was required).
110. See, e.g., EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (Keane II), 417 F.3d 789, 802 (7th Cir.
2005) (listing the plaintiff’s walking limitations and finding that a “jury could
conclude, based on this evidence and its own life experience,” that the plaintiff
suffered a substantial limitation relevant to an “average” person); EEOC v. Yellow
Freight Sys., Inc., No. 98 CIV. 2270, 2002 WL 31011859, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9,
2002) (disagreeing with Maynard II’s finding that a jury can never determine without
comparative evidence whether a certain impairment is substantially limiting); EEOC
v. Valu Merchandisers Co., No. 01-2224, 2002 WL 1932533, at *5–6 (D. Kan. Aug. 9,
2002) (finding that “the facts presented regarding the nature, severity and duration
of Kennedy’s impairment could lead a reasonable jury to conclude that Kennedy was,
in fact, permanently and substantially limited in the major life activity of lifting”);
Ward v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1225 (D.N.M. 2001)
(concluding that an impairment preventing the plaintiff from reaching above his
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life experiences” to determine if the plaintiff’s limitations are
111
Where the disability is less obvious, however, courts
substantial.
find a lack of substantial limitation as a matter of law if there is no
comparative evidence because the plaintiffs failed to convince the
court that their impairments deviate sufficiently from some “average”
112
norm.
In these cases, comparative evidence becomes, in practical
effect, mandatory.
For example, the Seventh Circuit in EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.
113
(Keane II) allowed a case to go to the jury on testimony from the
plaintiff, Judith Keane, that she “was unable to walk the equivalent of
114
one city block without her right leg and feet becoming numb.” She
also supplied a doctor’s report that noted she had “difficulty walking
distances as short as twenty feet,” and that “the way she walked was
115
very abnormal.”
Direct comparative evidence was not required,
because the court found “[a] reasonable jury could conclude, based
on this evidence and its own life experience, that Keane’s severe
difficulty in walking the equivalent of one city block was a substantial
116
limitation compared to the walking most people do.”
117
By contrast, in Lusk v. Ryder Integrated Logistics, the Tenth Circuit
upheld summary judgment for the employer after the employee
failed to present sufficient evidence that his forty-pound lifting
restriction substantially limited him in the major life activity of
118
lifting.
This was after the court concluded comparative evidence
head or lifting more than two pounds above his head was substantially limiting on its
face, and required no comparative evidence); see also Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance
Serv. Inc., 283 F.3d 11, 24 (1st Cir. 2002) (finding that evidence that the plaintiff was
a genetic amputee combined with her testimony concerning the extent of her
limitations in grasping things was sufficient to create an issue of fact); Lowe v.
Angelo’s Italian Foods, Inc., 87 F.3d 1170, 1174 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding that the
plaintiff created a genuine issue of material fact with evidence that she suffered from
multiple sclerosis and, as a result, was unable to lift items weighing more than fifteen
pounds).
111. Hayes v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 17 F. App’x 317, 321 (6th Cir. 2001)
(concluding that “[c]ommon sense and life experiences will permit finders of fact to
determine whether someone who cannot sit for more than [twenty or twenty-five
minutes] is significantly restricted as compared to the average person”); Witt v. Nw.
Aluminum Co., 177 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1131 (D. Or. 2001) (reasoning that “in
appropriate cases factfinders may draw on their own experience to determine
whether particular impairments constitute ‘substantial limitations’ of major life
activities”).
112. See infra notes 160–165 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of
comparative evidence in lifting cases).
113. 417 F.3d 789 (7th Cir. 2005).
114. Id. at 802.
115. Id. at 795.
116. Id. at 802.
117. 238 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 2001).
118. See id. at 1240–41 (finding that, without evidence of the “average” person’s
lifting capacity or the plaintiff’s substantial limitations in his day-to-day activities, a
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was not required as a matter of law to withstand a motion for
119
The court was willing to accept the
summary judgment.
proposition that an impairment substantially limiting “on its face”
created a genuine issue of fact, but was not convinced that a forty120
pound lifting restriction met that standard.
When courts find common sense and life experience sufficient,
they do not seem to be saying that there is a common sense standard
for evaluating ADA claims so much as they imply that a particular
case appears obvious to them. In other words, there is little question
in the “plain on their face” cases that the fact finder will conclude the
121
plaintiff’s limitation is substantial. Keane II is one such example.
122
Another is Hayes v. United Parcel Service, Inc., in which the Sixth
Circuit reversed summary judgment for the employer, finding that
the plaintiff was not required to present additional evidence of his
123
sitting limitations compared to the average population.
In that
case, the plaintiff established an inability to sit for more than about
124
twenty to twenty-five minutes at a time. The district court required
the plaintiff to present evidence of the average person’s ability to sit,
but the circuit court concluded that the fact finder could rely on
common sense and life experiences to determine that someone who
could sit for no more than that period of time was significantly
125
restricted as compared to the average person. Indeed, it does seem
obvious (especially to those in a profession like law that involves a lot
of sitting) that most people can sit for considerably more than twenty
minutes at a time.
Similarly, a federal district court in Oregon allowed the plaintiff’s
disability claim to survive summary judgment without expert
statement from the plaintiff’s doctor as to the severity of the impairment was
insufficient).
119. Id. at 1240 (citing the court’s decision in Lowe v. Angelo’s Italian Foods, Inc., 87
F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 1996), where the court found a lifting restriction of fifteen
pounds to be substantially limiting on its face, and required no comparative evidence
to determine that there existed a genuine issue of fact).
120. See id. at 1240–41 (citing other circuits’ holdings that lifting restrictions
similar to the plaintiff’s were not substantially limiting on their face).
121. See supra notes 113–116 and accompanying text (examining the evidence
provided and the Keane II court’s reasoning).
122. 17 F. App’x 317 (6th Cir. 2001).
123. See id. at 321 (stating that the fact finders’ common sense and life
experiences would sufficiently inform their determination of whether an inability to
sit for more than twenty to twenty-five minutes is significantly restrictive as compared
to the average person).
124. See id. at 320 (indicating that Hayes participated in an occupational readiness
program, which evaluated his sitting capability at twenty or twenty-five minutes).
125. See id. at 321 (distinguishing Hayes from the two cases relied on by the district
court, based on the credibility of Hayes’ evidence and the severity of his
impairment).
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comparative testimony, where the plaintiff was an individual who was
unable to walk more than fifty to one hundred feet without taking a
126
The court refused to take judicial notice of the average
break.
person’s ability to walk more than that distance, but instead allowed
the fact finder to draw on its own experience:
Factfinders do not need expert testimony to understand that a
person confined to a wheelchair is substantially limited in the
major life activity of walking. Factfinders similarly are competent
to weigh the evidence about other walking limitations to determine
whether those limitations are so substantial that they constitute a
127
disability.

The plaintiff’s testimony regarding his limitations and his doctor’s
128
report were sufficient to carry the case to the fact finder.
Walking, sitting, and lifting are all basic physical activities that
129
readily lend themselves to a common understanding of average. In
cases involving other less obvious limitations, courts have on occasion
not required specific comparative evidence if the plaintiff’s evidence
suggested a simple comparison to a readily-understood average
ability. The plaintiff in a Seventh Circuit learning disability case, for
example, avoided summary judgment when she presented specific
evidence about her note-taking process, from which the court was
convinced a reasonable inference could be drawn that her process
130
was substantially distinct from that of the average student.
By
contrast, a federal district court found a plaintiff who asserted he had
126. See Witt v. Nw. Aluminum Co., 177 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1131 (D. Or. 2001)
(finding that “[a]lthough this evidence does not compel a finding that Plaintiff was
disabled during the last few months he worked for Defendant, it is some evidence
from which a factfinder could determine Plaintiff’s ability to walk was substantially
limited”).
127. Id.
128. Id. The Witt court also noted the summary judgment standard in the Ninth
Circuit required plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases to produce only
minimal evidence to defeat a defense motion. See id. (distinguishing their standard
from that of the Eleventh Circuit (citing Chuang v. Univ. of Cal. Davis, 225 F.3d 115,
1123 (9th Cir. 2000))).
129. See supra notes 113–128 and accompanying text (summarizing several
examples of walking (Keane II and Witt), sitting (Hayes), and lifting (Lusk) cases).
130. Davidson v. Midelfort Clinic, Ltd., 133 F.3d 499, 510 (7th Cir. 1998). The
plaintiff in Davidson claimed that she had a record of disability in that she had
difficulties focusing in the classroom and assimilating new material. See id. at 509–10.
She established that during her secondary and post-secondary education, she had to
dictate her class notes and then write them out again by hand, and had to write out
passages she had just read in a textbook. Id. at 510. The court required no
additional comparative evidence, instead noting that it could “not imagine that the
average person in the general population finds it necessary to dictate one’s school
notes and then write them out again by hand, or to write out the passages she has just
read in a textbook, in order to assimilate the information.” Id. As with sitting, the
court’s understanding of average may well have been enhanced by personal
experience with long hours of studying.
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“mental and physical processes [that] are very slow as compared to
the average person” did not provide enough of a benchmark for the
131
jury to draw a common sense understanding of average.
The commonplace nature of the activity does not necessarily mean,
however, that the case will go to the fact finder using the common
sense standard. As discussed in the next section, the cases involving
lifting as a major life activity suggest that, in some sense, the common
nature of the activity may actually make it harder for plaintiffs to
convince the court that they have created a question of fact as to the
substantiality of their limitations. In these cases, courts are more
likely to presume most limitations are not substantial, regardless of
whether common sense and life experience might suggest otherwise.
C. Incoherent Comparative/Common Sense Distinctions and the Major Life
Activity of Lifting
The major life activity of lifting has played a unique role in
substantial limitation case law. Although sitting, walking, and
standing have to some extent raised similar concerns, lifting has
received more judicial consideration, perhaps because back
132
impairments tend to be quite prevalent.
Courts have been more
demanding of comparative evidence in lifting cases and, despite the
ADA’s requirement of individualized assessment, quite willing to find
133
lifting restrictions not substantially limiting as a matter of law.
Some courts presume that lifting restriction claims are not worthy
of ADA protection by summarily dismissing the significance of the
134
restrictions imposed on the plaintiff. Even as they accept lifting as a
135
major life activity, these courts will state that lifting restrictions
131. Huizenga v. Elkay Mfg., No. 99 C 50287, 2001 WL 640973, at *6 (N.D. Ill.
June 5, 2001).
132. See NAT’L INST. OF ARTHRITIS & MUSCULOSKELETAL & SKIN DISEASES, U.S. DEP’T
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HANDOUT ON HEALTH: BACK PAIN 1 (2005), available at
http://www.niams.nih.gov/Health_Info/Back_Pain/back_pain_hoh.pdf (explaining
“back pain affects an estimated 8 out of 10 people”).
133. Infra notes 160–165 and accompanying text.
134. See, e.g., Smith v. Quikrete Co., 204 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1008 (W.D. Ky. 2002)
(holding that a lifting restriction of twenty-five pounds does not limit an activity of
central importance in daily life); cf. Prickett v. Amoco Oil Co., 147 F. Supp. 2d 1147,
1154 (D. Utah 2001) (rejecting the significance of the plaintiff’s lifting, standing,
and sitting restrictions).
135. Lifting is not listed in the regulation defining “major life activities,” but is
mentioned in the interpretive guidance: “Major life activities include caring for
oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing,
learning, and working. This list is not exhaustive. For example, other major life
activities include, but are not limited to, sitting, standing, lifting, [and] reaching.” 29
C.F.R. §§ 1630, 1630.2(i) (2007). Some courts, such as the First Circuit, have
concluded that lifting is central to daily life and is therefore a major life activity. See
Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Serv., Inc., 283 F.3d 11, 21 (1st Cir. 2002) (finding that
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136

alone are not sufficient to prove substantial limitation.
As one
court put it, limitation on the ability to lift heavy objects is “part of
137
the human condition.” In some of the cases, the courts conflate the
major life activities of lifting and working. These cases either fail to
distinguish between working and lifting and subject lifting claims to
138
the same narrow reading as working claims, or erroneously import
the reasoning from the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Toyota
139
Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams that work-related
restrictions do not establish substantial limitation in the major life
140
activity of performing manual tasks. In the big picture, these courts
are insisting on comparative evidence in lifting cases, either directly
or indirectly through rulings on evidence as a matter of law, even
though lifting ability is something that can largely be judged by
common sense and life experience.
1.

De-individualizing the assessment of lifting limitations
A disability claim based on a lifting restriction alone is likely to
meet considerable judicial resistance. Some courts perceive a
difference between simple lifting restrictions and those associated
with other conditions, with simple restrictions more likely to be
141
rejected. Others treat the issue as one of threshold—the restriction
“[w]hether lifting pen to paper or glass to mouth, lifting is an integral part of
everyday life and seems to fit comfortably within the parameters set by the Court” in
Toyota v. Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002)). Other
courts have been less receptive. The Seventh Circuit has expressed general
skepticism that “lifting more than 10 pounds” is a major life activity. Mays v. Principi,
301 F.3d 866, 869 (7th Cir. 2002). The Eighth Circuit does not recognize lifting as a
stand-alone major life activity, but only as “part of a set of basic motor functions that
together represent a major life activity.” Nuzum v. Ozark Auto. Distribs., Inc., 432
F.3d 839, 845 (8th Cir. 2005). Whether lifting is a major life activity in and of itself is
beyond the scope of this Article, although it must be acknowledged that skepticism
on this issue may influence, if not drive, some of the restrictive interpretations of
cases discussed in the Article.
136. See, e.g., Wenzel v. Mo.-Am. Water Co., 404 F.3d 1038, 1041 (8th Cir. 2005)
(finding that “[a] lifting restriction, without more, is not a disability”); Law v. City of
Scottsdale, No. 98-6335, 2000 WL 799742, at *4 (6th Cir. June 15, 2000) (observing
that “[f]ederal case law supports that a maximum weight restriction is not a disability
as defined by the ADA”).
137. Buettner v. N. Okla. County Mental Health Ctr., 158 F. App’x 81, 87 (10th
Cir. 2005).
138. Infra Part III.C.2.a.
139. 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
140. Infra Part III.C.2.b.
141. See Mays v. Principi, 301 F.3d 866, 869–70 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that the
case involves only a general lifting restriction due to a back injury as opposed to a
case where “the plaintiff [is] missing an arm”); Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Serv.,
Inc., 283 F.3d 11, 22–23 (1st Cir. 2002) (finding the plaintiff’s claim distinguishable
from others where a weight restriction was insufficient to prove disability because the
plaintiff had only one available limb with which to lift); Smith v. Quikrete Co., 204 F.
Supp. 2d 1003, 1008 (W.D. Ky. 2002) (noting that “uniformly . . . courts seem
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must be greater than a certain weight threshold or the court is
142
These latter cases give lip
unwilling to consider it substantial.
service to the requirement of comparative evidence; courts have been
willing to rule as a matter of law that certain weight restrictions are
not substantial even absent any evidence of the average person’s
143
lifting ability.
The individualized assessment of the plaintiff’s
restrictions has been glossed over in favor of generalized conclusions
144
about the significance of certain restrictions.
In some cases, courts examine the reasons for a person’s difficulty
lifting to determine whether the lifting impairment is substantially
limiting. The Seventh Circuit sua sponte raised a concern that a lifting
limitation related to a back injury is not a disability, while at the same
145
time suggesting that one related to a physical deformity might be.
In the words of that court, the plaintiff’s disability claim based on a
146
restriction to light duty was questionable, not because she could not
prove the restriction, but because “[i]t is not as if the plaintiff w[as]
147
missing an arm.”
Although the issue had not been raised by the
parties, the court wanted to go on record “to register [its] doubts . . .
that a back injury that merely limits a person’s ability to lift heavy
148
objects creates a disability.”

reluctant to approve disability-in-lifting claims based only upon a general restriction
on lifting heavy objects”).
142. See Velarde v. Associated Reg’l & Univ. Pathologists, 61 F. App’x 627, 630
(10th Cir. 2003) (suggesting “there is a threshold of severity of impairment below
which the plaintiff bears the burden of proving substantiality”).
143. See, e.g., Williams v. Channel Master Satellite Sys., Inc., 101 F.3d 346, 349 (4th
Cir. 1996) (holding, “as a matter of law, that a twenty-five pound lifting restriction—
particularly when compared to an average person’s abilities—[was] not” substantial).
There is no indication in the opinion, however, that the court had comparative
evidence on which to base that finding. Id. When plaintiffs do submit evidence
regarding their limitations, courts have still been dismissive, suggesting that
substantial limitation requires proof of restriction of the activities central to daily
living. See, e.g., Velarde, 61 F. App’x at 630–31 (rejecting the plaintiff’s limitation
evidence because it did not show substantial limitation in “his overall daily
functioning”); see also infra Part III.C.2.b (discussing the additional evidentiary
hurdles in more detail).
144. See Marinelli v. City of Erie, 216 F.3d 354, 363–64 (3d Cir. 2000) (rejecting
the significance of the plaintiff’s evidence of limitation because the court found his
ten-pound lifting restriction “not far removed from the twenty-five pound restrictions
our sister circuits have held” insufficient).
145. Mays, 301 F.3d at 869–70. In Mays, the parties apparently did not dispute
whether the plaintiff’s back injury was a disability, which the court found
“puzzl[ing].” Id. at 869.
146. The plaintiff in Mays was restricted to positions not involving lifting over ten
pounds. Id. at 868.
147. Id. at 869.
148. Id. at 870. The court also observed that “[t]he number of Americans
restricted by back problems to light work is legion.” Id. at 869.

2007]

COMPARATIVE EVIDENCE OR COMMON EXPERIENCE

437

Indeed, where the plaintiff’s lifting is restricted by some other
physical condition, the court may find disability with an emphasis on
the case not being simply about lifting capacity. For example, in a
case involving a person born without a left hand, the First Circuit
distinguished other lifting cases as “inapposite” because a “missing
hand is a more profound impairment than a simple inability to lift
objects over a certain weight. Such an impairment poses a type of
restriction on lifting not shared by a significant portion of the
149
populace.”
Likewise, the Tenth Circuit accepted, with little
question, a fifteen-pound weight restriction while noting that the
150
restriction was the result of the plaintiff’s multiple sclerosis.
A
federal district court in Alabama found the “quantum of proof” not
to require comparative evidence where the plaintiff’s limitations were
the result of a paralyzed right arm, because that type of restriction
151
was substantial “on its face.”
In both of these cases, the courts
focused on the nature of the plaintiff’s impairment not in terms of
the limitation but in terms of how significant they viewed the
impairment itself to be.
In the bulk of cases, however, the debate centers on how many
pounds the plaintiff can lift and whether the plaintiff must present
more evidence than the individualized facts of their restrictions. At
times, the cases suggest a per se threshold and at other times no
coherent standard. The Tenth Circuit has gone so far as to suggest
that there is “a threshold of severity of impairment below which the
152
plaintiff bears the burden of proving substantiality.”
While this
suggests some clear line has been drawn, this is not the case. What
the threshold is, and when plaintiffs must have comparative evidence
or when they can rely on individualized evidence of their limitations
153
and the jury’s common sense and life experience, is not clear.

149. Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Serv., Inc., 283 F.3d 11, 23 (1st Cir. 2002). The
lower court in Gillen rejected the plaintiff’s claim, in part, because the plaintiff had a
demonstrated ability to lift objects of forty-to-fifty pounds. Id. at 22.
150. Lowe v. Angelo’s Italian Foods, Inc., 87 F.3d 1170, 1174 (10th Cir. 1996).
The sum total of the Lowe court’s consideration of the plaintiff’s lifting claim was that
she had multiple sclerosis, a long-term, incurable disease, and as a result, was unable
to lift more than fifteen pounds. Id. On this basis, the court found the plaintiff to
have created a genuine issue of material fact for the jury to consider on the issue of
whether she was substantially limited in her ability to lift. Id.
151. Crutcher v. Mobile Hous. Bd., No. 04-0499, 2005 WL 2675207, at *11 (S.D.
Ala. Oct. 20, 2005).
152. Velarde v. Associated Reg’l & Univ. Pathologists, 61 F. App’x 627, 630 (10th
Cir. 2003).
153. Cf. EEOC v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., No. 98 Civ. 2270, 2002 WL 31011859, at
*13 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2002) (noting that cases involving “the major life activity of
sitting do not yield a single benchmark against which to test all sitting limitations”).
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The Tenth Circuit’s decisions illustrate this. That court found a
154
fifteen-pound lifting restriction substantially limiting on its face, but
a twenty-five pound repetitive lifting/thirty-five pound occasional
155
restriction insufficient, at least without additional evidence. In the
latter case, the court rejected the plaintiff’s request that the court
“‘infer’ [from evidence of her limitations] that she has demonstrated
156
a significant restriction on the major life activity of lifting.”
The
court reasoned that “[t]his evidence in fact says nothing about the
capabilities of the average person to allow a comparison, . . . [and
therefore] plaintiff’s evidence is insufficient to show she is
157
substantially limited in the major life activity of lifting.” By contrast,
the fifteen-pound lifting restriction case involved a plaintiff who had
multiple sclerosis, which, as discussed above, seemed to lower the
court’s expectations regarding the amount of evidence that was
158
required to prove substantiality. Whether the Tenth Circuit would
find fifteen pounds substantial in a simple lifting case, in the absence
159
of the additional impairment, is an open question.
There are a number of simple lifting cases that assert a twenty-five
160
pound restriction is not substantially limiting. But there are other
154. See Lowe, 87 F.3d at 1174 (determining that a fifteen-pound restriction is
sufficient to create a jury question); see also Lusk v. Ryder Integrated Logistics, 238
F.3d 1237, 1240 (10th Cir. 2001) (interpreting Lowe as not requiring comparative
evidence when the “impairment appear[s] substantially limiting on its face”).
155. Gibbs v. St. Anthony Hosp., No. 96-6063, 1997 WL 57156, at *2 (10th Cir.
Feb. 12, 1997) (finding the plaintiff failed to point to facts regarding the capabilities
of the average person).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. See Lowe, 87 F.3d at 1174 (asserting that a simple consideration of the
plaintiff’s multiple sclerosis makes it “unnecessary to consider the additional factors
relied upon by the district court”); see also supra note 150 and accompanying text.
159. A subsequent district court opinion cites Lowe for the proposition that no
comparative evidence is needed when the restriction is substantially limiting on its
face; in that case, the limitation was a five-to-eight pound lifting restriction. EEOC v.
Valu Merchs. Co., No. 01-2224, 2002 WL 1932533, at *5 (D. Kan. 2002).
160. See, e.g., Thompson v. Holy Family Hosp., 121 F.3d 537, 540 (9th Cir. 1997)
(agreeing with other courts’ determinations “that lifting restrictions similar to
Thompson’s are not substantially limiting”); Gibbs, 1997 WL 57156, at *2 (dismissing
the plaintiff’s claim for failure to provide sufficient comparative evidence regarding
the substantial limitation resulting from a twenty-five pound repetitive lifting
restriction); Williams v. Channel Master Satellite Sys., Inc., 101 F.3d 346, 349 (4th
Cir. 1996) (holding, “as a matter of law, that a twenty-five pound lifting limitation . . .
does not constitute a significant restriction on one’s ability to lift, work, or perform
any other major life activity”); Prickett v. Amoco Oil Co., 147 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 115354 (D. Utah 2001) (finding that, despite his twenty-five pound lifting restriction, the
plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence of a substantial limitation “as compared
to the average person in the general population”); cf. Aucutt v. Six Flags Over MidAm., Inc., 85 F.3d 1311, 1319 (8th Cir. 1996) (dismissing the plaintiff’s claim for
failure to present sufficient evidence of limitation, noting that the only evidence the
plaintiff had of a medical limitation was a twenty-five pound lifting restriction).
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inconsistent decisions.
One case found that a twenty-pound
restriction is substantial enough to raise a jury question on limited
161
comparative evidence, while another found a ten-to-fifteen pound
restriction insufficient as a matter of law, despite evidence of
162
restrictions on the plaintiff’s daily activities. A restriction as severe
as ten pounds has been found not substantial enough as a matter of
163
law in at least one case.
The willingness of some courts to rule on lifting claims as a matter
of law is troubling. As the Sixth Circuit noted, these rulings conflict
with the standard of individualized determination required by the
164
ADA.
Yet, some courts seem quite willing to cite the outcomes in
prior cases as the sole basis for ruling the plaintiff cannot prove
165
substantial limitation.
161. See Whitfield v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 2d 434, 439 (D. Del. 1999)
(involving a plaintiff who had a registered nurse testify that, in her opinion, a normal
healthy adult is able to lift more than twenty pounds). Whitfield is particularly
interesting because, in an earlier decision, the district court dismissed the plaintiff’s
claim, finding the plaintiff’s back injuries “commonplace,” and expressing concerns
about “the dearth of comparative evidence” she presented in the case. Whitfield v.
Pathmark Stores, Inc., 971 F. Supp. 851, 858 (D. Del. 1997), vacated in part, 39 F.
Supp. 2d 434 (D. Del. 1999). In its later opinion, reversing its grant of summary
judgment, the district court not only credited the nurse’s testimony, it also noted
that the substantiality was “evident when one considers that 20 pounds amounts to a
large bag of dog food or a small child.” Whitfield, 39 F. Supp. 2d at 439.
162. Zarzycki v. United Tech. Corp., 30 F. Supp. 2d 283, 289 (D. Conn. 1998). In
Zarzycki, the plaintiff presented specific testimony regarding his difficulty holding
heavy weights in front of him in his job as a tester and assembler, and regarding his
inability to do normal activities like housekeeping. Id. The court rejected his claim,
citing an Eighth Circuit case that reasoned “a general lifting restriction imposed by a
physician, without more, is insufficient to constitute a disability within the meaning
of the ADA.” Id. (citing Snow v. Ridgeview Medical Center, 128 F.3d 1201, 1207 (8th
Cir. 1997)).
163. See Marinelli v. City of Erie, 216 F.3d 354, 364 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Mays v.
Principi, 301 F.3d 866, 868–70 (7th Cir. 2002) (raising sua sponte the issue of whether
a plaintiff, who alleged a restriction to “sedentary work, maximum lifts of 10 pounds,
no work at or above shoulder level, and no patient lifting,” had a disability). The
Third Circuit’s reasoning in Marinelli suggests that even if the plaintiff presented it
with evidence concerning his restrictions, it would not have mattered. 216 F.3d at
363–64 (“Even if we were to consider such evidence, however, courts have rejected
claims of disability based on an inability to lift similar weights to those with which
Marinelli alleges to experience difficulty.”).
164. Burns v. Coca-Cola Enters., Inc., 222 F.3d 247, 255 n.3 (6th Cir. 2000)
(noting the Fourth Circuit’s ruling in Williams that twenty-five pound restrictions are
not substantial as a matter of law “conflicts with the ADA’s directives that that the
determination whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity must
be made on an individual basis”).
165. See Williams, 101 F.3d at 349. Although the Fourth Circuit in Williams briefly
referenced a comparison to the average person, it did not actually look at evidence
that set out what average lifting ability is or how such a restriction impacted the
plaintiff’s daily activities, despite briefly referencing a comparison to the average
person. Instead, it noted it was following the Eight Circuit’s holding in Aucutt. See id.
(“Like the Eight Circuit, we hold, as a matter of law, that a twenty-five pound lifting
limitation—particularly when compared to an average person’s abilities—does not
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By ruling as a matter of law, these courts assume that they know
what normal lifting ability is and how integral it is (or is not) to daily
activity, and that there would be no comparative evidence to establish
166
otherwise.
There is an inherent inconsistency between insisting on
comparative evidence and ruling as a matter of law that certain
limitations are not substantial enough. The weight limitation itself
seems to be driving the courts’ reasoning, not the impact on the
individual plaintiff or a true need for expert evaluation of deviation
167
from the average.
Overbroad reasoning is also not uncommon. The Third Circuit
rejected a ten-pound lifting case, for example, reasoning that the
plaintiff’s “ten-pound limitation is not far removed from the twentyfive pound restrictions our sister circuits have held not to render one
168
disabled under the ADA.” There are also cases in which lifting as
169
That
little as ten pounds is referred to as “heavy lifting.”
characterization makes it easier to dismiss the substantiality of the
limitation. One court suggested that restrictions on heavy lifting

constitute a significant restriction on one’s ability to lift, work, or perform any other
major life activity.”). In Aucutt, however, the plaintiff apparently failed to specifically
identify what major life activities he alleged were substantially limited, and while the
court notes his only limitation was a twenty-five pound lifting restriction, it did not
specifically address lifting as a separate major life activity. Aucutt, 85 F.3d at 1319.
Consequently, Aucutt does not specifically hold as a matter of law that a twenty-five
pound lifting restriction cannot be found to be substantial. Id.
Another problem with some cases is that the authority they cite for the proposition
that lifting restrictions alone cannot be a disability are actually cases alleging
substantial limitation in the major life activity of working. See, e.g., Rakity v. Dillon
Co., 302 F.3d 1152, 1160 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing both lifting and working cases to
support its finding of no substantial limitation in a lifting disability case). Because
working is subject to a separate set of substantiality criteria, the reliance on those
cases in lifting claims is especially misplaced. See infra Part III.C.2.a.
166. See Williams, 101 F.3d at 349. The court in Williams justified its finding simply
by noting the Eight Circuit had also so held in Aucutt. Id.
167. Where the court focuses more on the impact on the individual, the lifting
restriction is more likely to be considered substantial. For example, the Eighth
Circuit concluded that a plaintiff who had a fifteen-pound lifting restriction had
created a jury question with evidence that he was limited in his ability to walk, stand
for long periods of time, and bend at the waist without pain, as a result of back
surgeries. Webner v. Titan Distrib., Inc., 267 F.3d 828, 834 (8th Cir. 2001). That
court also considered a doctor’s opinion that the plaintiff had an eighteen-percent
whole body impairment as a result of his back surgeries. Id. Similarly, in Whitfield v.
Pathmark Stores, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 2d 434, 439 (D. Del. 1999), the court concluded that
the impact of a twenty-pound lifting restriction was “evident when one considers that
20 pounds amounts to a large bag of dog food or a small child.” Id. at 439.
168. Marinelli, 216 F.3d at 364.
169. See Mays v. Principi, 301 F.3d 866, 869–70 (7th Cir. 2002) (referring to a
restriction from lifting over ten pounds as “merely limit[ing] a person’s ability to lift
heavy objects”); Ray v. Glidden Co., 85 F.3d 227, 229 (5th Cir. 1996) (characterizing
a plaintiff who was medically permitted to lift no more than five-to-ten pounds as
able to lift “as long as he avoids heavy lifting”).
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170

were just “part of the human condition.”
Another suggested that
heavy lifting is a discrete task, and that the ADA does not protect
171
individuals who are merely unable to perform a discrete task.
The First Circuit found reluctance to recognize heavy lifting
restrictions “understandable,” on the theory that because “strength
varies widely throughout the population,” to do otherwise would
make many normal conditions (infancy, aging, and being out of
172
shape) a disability.
Given the regulations’ failure to incorporate
age and sex-specific considerations in the definition of “substantially
limits,” the First Circuit might be correct if courts were talking about
what can accurately be characterized as heavy lifting. According to
173
DOT, however, jobs requiring the ability occasionally or even
frequently to lift ten or even twenty pounds do not qualify as heavy
174
work.
The DOT classifies jobs based on categories of strength factors,
which evaluate the worker’s involvement in activities that include,
175
among other things, lifting.
Lifting is defined as “[r]aising or
170. Buettner v. N. Okla. County Mental Health Ctr., 158 F. App’x 81, 87 (10th
Cir. 2005); see Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Serv., Inc., 283 F.3d 11, 22 (1st Cir. 2002)
(suggesting that “a capacity to perform heavy lifting is not a trait shared by the
majority of the population”).
171. Ray, 85 F.3d at 229.
172. Gillen, 283 F.3d at 22. Although the court in Gillen endorsed rejecting ADA
claims based on heavy lifting, it distinguished the facts in that case on the grounds
the plaintiff was missing most of the lower part of her left arm. Id. at 22–23. The
court reasoned that “[e]ven if she is able to lift more poundage than many twohanded individuals, the manner in which she lifts and the conditions under which
she can lift will be significantly restricted because she has only one available limb.”
Id. at 23.
173. DOT, supra note 23. The Department of Labor has been transitioning to a
different database, O*NET, that does not classify based on weight ranges, but rather
the degree of importance in an occupation of the ability to “exert maximum muscle
force to lift, push, pull or carry objects.” O*NET Online, Abilities—Static Strength,
http://online.onetcenter.org/find/descriptor/result/1.A.3.a.1 (last visited Oct. 21,
2007). The DOT continues to be used in social security disability determinations.
See, e.g., Whitzell v. Barnhart, 379 F. Supp. 2d 204, 217 (D. Mass. 2005) (explaining
that “[o]ccupational evidence provided by a [vocational expert] generally should be
consistent with the occupational information supplied by the DOT” in a social
security disability case).
174. DOT, supra note 23, at 1013.
175. See id. (presenting a “Physical Demands Strength Rating” scheme). The DOT
defines its strength ratings regime as follows:
The Physical Demands Strength Rating reflects the estimated overall
strength requirement of the job . . . .
It represents the strength
requirements which are considered to be important for average, successful
work performance.
The strength rating is expressed by one of five terms: Sedentary, Light,
Medium, Heavy, and Very Heavy. In order to determine the overall rating,
an evaluation is made of the worker’s involvement in the following activities:
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a. Standing, Walking, Sitting
Standing—Remaining on one’s feet in an upright position at a work
station with-out moving about.
Walking—Moving about on foot.
Sitting—Remaining in a seated position.
b. Lifting, Carrying, Pushing, Pulling
Lifting—Raising or lowering an object from one level to another
(includes upward pulling).
Carrying—Transporting an object, usually holding it in the hands or
arms, or on the shoulder.
Pushing—Exerting force upon an object so that the object moves
away from the force (includes slapping, striking, kicking, and treadle
actions).
Pulling—Exerting force upon an object so that the object moves
toward the force (includes jerking).
Lifting, pushing, and pulling are evaluated in terms of both intensity
and duration. Consideration is given to the weight handled,
position of the worker’s body, and the aid given by helpers or
mechanical equipment. Carrying most often is evaluated in terms of
duration, weight carried, and distance carried.
Estimating the Strength factor rating for an occupation requires the
exercise of care on the part of occupational analysts in evaluating
the force and physical effort a worker must exert. For instance, if
the worker is in a crouching position, it may be much more difficult
to push an object than if pushed at waist height. Also, if the worker
is required to lift and carry continuously or push and pull objects
over long distances, the worker may exert as much physical effort as
is required to similarly move objects twice as heavy, but less
frequently and/or over shorter distances.
Id. at 1012.
The DOT then sets out the strength requirements for each of these categories:
S—Sedentary Work⎯Exerting up to 10 pounds of force occasionally
(Occasionally: activity or condition exists up to 1/3 of the time) and/or a
negligible amount of force frequently (Frequently: activity or condition
exists from 1/3 to 2/3 of the time) to lift, carry, push, pull, or otherwise
move objects, including the human body. Sedentary work involves sitting
most of the time, but may involve walking or standing for brief periods of
time. Jobs are sedentary if walking and standing are required only
occasionally and all other sedentary criteria are met.
L—Light Work⎯Exerting up to 20 pounds of force occasionally, and/or up
to 10 pounds of force frequently, and/or a negligible amount of force
constantly (Constantly: activity or condition exists 2/3 or more of the time)
to move objects. Physical demand requirements are in excess of those for
Sedentary Work. Even though the weight lifted may be only a negligible
amount, a job should be rated Light Work: (1) when it requires walking or
standing to a significant degree; or (2) when it requires sitting most of the
time but entails pushing and/or pulling of arm or leg controls; and/or (3)
when the job requires working at a production rate pace entailing the
constant pushing and/or pulling of materials even though the weight of
those materials is negligible. NOTE: The constant stress and strain of
maintaining a production rate pace, especially in an industrial setting, can
be and is physically demanding of a worker even though the amount of force
exerted is negligible.
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lowering an object from one level to another (including upward
176
Pulling is defined as “exerting force upon an object so
pulling).”
177
that the object moves toward the force (includes jerking).”
Strength ratings are expressed by “five terms: Sedentary, Light,
178
Medium, Heavy, and Very Heavy.” Heavy work is described as that
requiring the exertion of “50 to 100 pounds of force occasionally,
and/or 25 to 50 pounds of force frequently, and/or 10 to 20 pounds
179
of force constantly to move objects.”
By contrast, light work
involves exerting “up to 20 pounds of force occasionally, and/or 10
pounds of force frequently, and/or a negligible amount of force
180
constantly.”
For sedentary work, the figures are “up to 10 pounds
of force occasionally” and “a negligible amount of force
181
frequently.”
These classifications indicate that courts have been too cursory in
their rejection of weight restrictions. The ten and twenty-five pound
lifting restrictions imposed in many of the rejected cases implicate
medium, light, and even sedentary work, which is not the heavy labor
182
courts seem to think would be out of reach of the average person.
Indeed, the EEOC has expressed an opinion that heavy lifting is not
self-defining, but rather, each job has to be evaluated individually for

M—Medium Work—Exerting 20 to 50 pounds of force occasionally, and/or
10 to 25 pounds of force frequently, and/or greater than negligible up to 10
pounds of force constantly to move objects. Physical Demand requirements
are in excess of those for Light Work.
H—Heavy Work—Exerting 50 to 100 pounds of force occasionally, and/or
25 to 50 pounds of force frequently, and/or 10 to 20 pounds of force
constantly to move objects. Physical Demand requirements are in excess of
those for Medium Work.
V—Very Heavy Work—Exerting in excess of 100 pounds of force
occasionally, and/or in excess of 50 pounds of force frequently, and/or in
excess of 20 pounds of force constantly to move objects. Physical Demand
requirements are in excess of those for Heavy Work.
Id. at 1013.
176. Id. at 1012.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Even the assumption that the average person cannot perform heavy labor is
questionable. The jobs listed in O*NET for which static strength is an important
factor include such categories as general farm workers, construction laborers, and
janitors and cleaners. See generally O*NET, supra note 24. For a person with little
education, these heavy labor jobs may be the primary source of employment.
Interview with Jack Musgrave, M.S., Vocational Servs. Manager, Evaluation and Dev.
Ctr., S. Ill. Univ. Rehab. Inst., in Carbondale, IL (July 11, 2006).
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183

the actual demand it makes.
Heavy lifting has instead become a
catch-phrase for some courts, circumventing the individualized
assessment the ADA requires.
2.

Confusing lifting with working to demand more comparative evidence
ADA working disability cases have also negatively impacted lifting
disability cases, although they have only some elements in common.
The negative impact has occurred in at least two ways. First, some
courts lump together working claims and lifting claims without
184
making distinctions between the categories. The resulting amalgam
is not just confusing, it once again fails to afford the individualized
assessment required under the ADA.
Second, some courts have imported the reasoning from the
Supreme Court’s decision in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky,
185
Inc. v. Williams to suggest that work-related lifting restrictions are
186
While some
not sufficient to show substantial limitation in lifting.
types of work-only restrictions might indeed be insufficient to
establish substantial limitation, the courts’ reasoning is overbroad in
rejecting cases solely because the evidence is based on work-related
assessment of lifting capacity. More significantly, these cases applying
Toyota reflect that a type of doctrinal creep has occurred, one which
potentially transforms consideration of every major life activity into
one catch-all category of “tasks central to daily living.”

183. See Letter from Claire Gonzales, Dir. of Commc’n & Legislative Affairs, U.S.
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n (June 29, 1998) [hereinafter Guidance
Letter], available at http://www.jan.wvu.edu/letters/Back_JUN_98.doc (last visited
Sept. 26, 2007) (responding to an inquiry of whether a person disqualified from
heavy labor has a disability by noting that an individualized assessment of the
particular job is required). The EEOC Guidance Letter also stated that
an[] individual whose back impairment prevents him/her from lifting more
than fifteen pounds is substantially limited in the major life activity of lifting
because the average person in the general population can lift fifteen pounds
with little or no difficulty. On the other hand, an individual whose back
impairment prevents him/her from lifting more than fifty pounds is not
substantially limited . . . because the average person in the general
population cannot lift fifty pounds with little or no difficulty.
Id.
184. See, e.g., Nuzum v. Ozark Auto. Distrib., Inc., 432 F.3d 839, 845–46 (8th Cir.
2005) (noting a line of cases where courts have assessed lifting restrictions by
whether they pose a substantial limitation on the major life activity of working);
Williams v. Channel Master Satellite Sys., Inc., 101 F.3d 346, 349 (4th Cir. 1996)
(holding that a twenty-five pound weight restriction “does not constitute a significant
restriction on one’s ability to lift, work, or perform any other major life activity”).
185. 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
186. See Velarde v. Associated Reg’l & Univ. Pathologists, 61 F. App’x 627, 630–31
(10th Cir. 2003) (holding that the plaintiff’s claim failed because his evidence of
limitation addressed only his work abilities and not his activities of daily living).
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Amalgamating lifting and working

There is a confusing amalgam in ADA cases of the major life
activities of lifting and working. As discussed in the previous section,
some courts have concluded that lifting restrictions by themselves do
187
not substantially limit the major life activity of lifting. Some courts
have similarly concluded that lifting restrictions do not establish that
a plaintiff is substantially limited in the major life activity of
188
working.
In other words, plaintiffs cannot show that they are
substantially limited in working because the lifting restriction is not
evidence that the plaintiff is prevented from performing a broad class
189
of jobs.
In both sets of cases, courts tend to cite other lifting and
working cases interchangeably. Some lump the major life activities
together: the lifting limitation “does not constitute a significant
restriction on one’s ability to lift, work, or perform any other major
190
life activity.”
Others string cite both lifting and working claims
191
without noting a distinction.
Working is, however, subject to a different analysis. Determining
whether the plaintiff is substantially limited in the major life activity
of working requires comparison to other individuals with similar
training, skills, and ability, rather than to the general (or “average”)
192
population. Unlike the other major life activities, working does not
193
proceed from a single construct based on average human ability.

187. Supra notes 125–155 and accompanying text.
188. See, e.g., Olds v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 127 F. App’x 779, 782 (6th Cir.
2005) (“[A] weight restriction alone is not considered a disability under the ADA.”);
Williams, 101 F.3d at 349 (“[A]s a matter of law, . . . a twenty-five pound lifting
limitation . . . does not constitute a significant restriction on one’s ability to lift, work,
or perform any other major life activity.”). But see Taylor v. Fed. Express Corp., 429
F.3d 461, 464 (4th Cir. 2005) (recognizing that working cases involving lifting are
subject to individualized inquiry of the effect on the plaintiff’s employment
prospects).
189. See Olds, 127 F. App’x at 782 (finding the plaintiff’s permanent lifting
restriction proved he was prevented from doing his old job, and other jobs at his old
employer, but did not show he was prevented from performing a broad class of jobs).
190. Williams, 101 F.3d at 349; see McKay v. Toyota Motor Mfg., U.S.A., Inc., 110
F.3d 369, 376–77 (6th Cir. 1997) (Hillman, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority
completely ignored the plaintiff’s issue on appeal that she was substantially limited in
lifting, instead ruling solely that her lifting restriction failed to be a substantial
limitation on her ability to work).
191. See, e.g., Rakity v. Dillon Co., 302 F.3d 1152, 1160 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing
both lifting and working cases without distinguishing them); Law v. City of Scottsville,
No. 98-6335, 2000 WL 799742, at *4 (6th Cir. June 15, 2000) (in a lifting claim, the
court cites both lifting and working cases for rule that maximum weight restrictions
are not disabilities).
192. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3) (2007).
193. Id. § 1630.2(j)(1).
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194

There are cases that recognize this distinction. Where courts fail
to do so, however, there is in effect a rush to judgment that lifting
restrictions are insubstantial as a matter of law. The courts do not
seem particularly concerned about the specific parameters of the
195
ADA claim actually before them.
Although much of the failure to make the distinction can be
196
explained by a generally narrow reading of the ADA, there seems to
be a particular hostility to cases involving back injuries. As previously
noted, the Seventh Circuit in particular has not shied away from
expressing its concern that recognizing claims arising out of back
197
injuries will result in an inordinate number of ADA claims.
Back
injury claims are like a specter that haunts the federal judiciary, their
worst fear that the ADA has changed them into workers’
198
compensation forums.
Perhaps for this reason, whether the case
alleges a basic motor skill disability or a working disability is of limited
concern to them.

194. See Burns v. Coca-Cola Enters., Inc., 222 F.3d 247, 255 n.3 (6th Cir. 2000)
(noting that the Fourth Circuit’s ruling as a matter of law in Williams that a twentyfive pound weight restriction is not substantially limiting “conflicts with the ADA’s
directives that the determination . . . must be made on an individual basis, and that
the impaired individual’s ability to work must be compared not with ‘an average
persons’s [sic] abilities,’ but with the abilities of a person with ‘comparable training,
skills and abilities.’”) (citations omitted); see also Thompson v. Holy Family Hosp.,
121 F.3d 537, 539–40 (9th Cir. 1997) (separately analyzing the lifting claim against
the general population and the working claim against a person of similar training,
skills, and abilities).
195. See, e.g., Williams, 101 F.3d at 349 (holding that a twenty-five pound lifting
restriction “does not constitute a significant restriction on one’s ability to lift, work,
or perform any other major life activity”).
196. Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA.
L. REV. 555, 566–68 (2001) (observing that courts have “ridden herd” on ADA claims
with the result that even deserving claims face a “death warrant”).
197. See Mays v. Principi, 301 F.3d 866, 869 (7th Cir. 2002) (observing that “[t]he
number of Americans restricted by back problems to light work is legion”); see also
supra notes 145–148 and accompanying text. A similar sentiment was expressed by
the First Circuit, who urged caution in accepting lifting restrictions as disabilities
(despite finding lifting to be a major life activity): “strength varies widely throughout
the population, and if a restriction on heavy lifting were considered a substantial
limitation on a major life activity, then the ranks of the disabled would swell to
include infants, the elderly, the weak, and the out-of-shape.” Gillen v. Fallon
Ambulance Serv., Inc., 283 F.3d 11, 22 (1st Cir. 2002).
198. Pedigo v. P.A.M. Transp., Inc., 891 F. Supp. 482, 485–86 (W.D. Ark. 1994),
vacated on other grounds, 60 F.3d 1300 (8th Cir. 1995) (expressing skepticism about
“the [ADA’s] potential of turning federal courts into worker’s compensation
commissions, deterring such courts from competently and expeditiously handling
important, traditionally federal controversies”).
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b. Broadening Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v.
Williams’ “activities of daily living” standard beyond manual tasks
claims
Lifting cases can also be used to illustrate another area of
evidentiary confusion—namely, whether these and similar claims are
subject to the rule set out by the Supreme Court in Toyota Motor
199
Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams. As previously noted in Part
200
II, the Supreme Court in Toyota held that when evaluating whether
a plaintiff is substantially limited in the major life activity of
performing manual tasks, it is not sufficient to consider only work201
related limitations. Rather, the plaintiff must show that she has “an
impairment that prevents or severely restricts the individual from
doing activities that are of central importance to most people’s daily
202
lives,” which includes home-related activities.
As this section discusses, some courts apply Toyota to lifting
impairment claims without noting the critical distinctions between
the major life activities of lifting and performing manual tasks. As a
result, they deemphasize what are otherwise substantial limitations on
the motor skill of lifting simply because the plaintiff experiences the
203
impact of them more in the workplace than in home life. Further,
courts appear to be developing a new, one-size-fits-all standard for
evaluating substantial limitation, one that requires plaintiffs to prove
inability to perform very basic tasks (what might be called a
toothbrushing inability threshold).
The judicial trend has been to treat Toyota as announcing an
additional set of criteria that ADA plaintiffs must meet in order to
199. 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
200. Supra notes 60–71 and accompanying text.
201. 534 U.S. at 200–01.
202. Id. at 198. The Court’s use of “severely restricts” has been criticized as not
consistent with the ADA, which requires a “substantial” limitation, not a “severe” one.
See Marcosson, supra note 67, at 373 (posing question of whether a legislator
considering an amendment to change “substantially limits” to “prevents or severely
restricts” would see that change “as expanding, limiting, or making no difference in
the statute’s coverage”).
203. Although lifting ability is used as the primary example in the discussion, the
extension of Toyota has occurred in other major life activity cases as well. The Ninth
Circuit, for example, read Toyota to require a plaintiff with monocular vision to show
his eyesight was severely restricted in comparison to how unimpaired individuals “use
their eyesight in daily life.” See EEOC v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 306 F.3d 794, 802–
03 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding plaintiffs failed to state disability claim where their loss of
near-field vision did not keep them from driving, reading, using tools, and playing
sports); see also Barta v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 307 F. Supp. 2d 773, 776, 779–80 (E.D.
Va. 2004) (requiring a plaintiff who established that she had correctable eyesight of
20/200, which qualified her as “statutorily blind” under the Social Security Act, to
present specific evidence of how her blindness actually impacted specific day-to-day
activities).
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avoid summary dismissal of their claims. For example, in Nuzum v.
204
Ozark Automotive Distributors, Inc., the Eighth Circuit relied heavily
on Toyota to re-interpret its prior cases addressing lifting
205
restrictions.
In Nuzum, the court first acknowledged that it had
before recognized “the basic motor function of ‘lifting’ as a major life
206
activity.” The court now explained that
in cases in which plaintiffs have established restrictions on lifting,
we have said flatly that restrictions on lifting will not be enough to
establish disability. . . . If no amount of limitation on an activity
suffices to establish disability, then the activity is not a major life
activity in its own right. We have said, however, that a substantial
limitation of a constellation of such basic motor functions could
suffice to prove disability. Therefore, rather than viewing lifting as
a major life activity in its own right, it is more accurate to say that it
is part of a set of basic motor functions that together represent a
207
major life activity.

This reasoning led the court to Toyota: “Not only have we required
limitations on a set, rather than on individual basic motor functions,
to satisfy the ‘substantial limitation’ requirement, but we have
208
recently applied the [Toyota] standard to such functions.”
The
court acknowledged that “the functions at issue were neither ‘tasks,’
nor ‘manual,’” but it nonetheless required the plaintiff to prove that
he was prevented or severely restricted from performing a set of
209
activities of central importance to most people’s daily lives.
Thus, although the motor functions listed in the EEOC definition
are designated as major life activities in their own right, our cases
show a finding of disability depends not on whether the plaintiff
can perform every one of those functions, but on whether the net
effect of the impairment is to prevent or severely restrict the
plaintiff from doing the set of activities that are “of central
210
importance to most people’s daily lives.”

204. 432 F.3d 839 (8th Cir. 2005).
205. Id. at 845–46.
206. Id. at 844.
207. Id. at 844–45 (citations omitted).
208. Id. at 845. The court noted that it previously rejected a claim in which the
plaintiff was alleged to be “unable to grip, reach, lift, stand, sit, or walk” because
there was no evidence “show[ing] how these limitations ‘impacted tasks central to
most people’s daily lives.’” Id. (citing Philip v. Ford Motor Co., 328 F.3d 1020, 1025
(8th Cir. 2003)).
209. Id.
210. Id. at 846. In a subsequent case, the Eighth Circuit apparently interpreted
Nuzum to treat lifting claims as manual task claims. See Breitkreutz v. Cambrex
Charles City, Inc., 450 F.3d 780, 783–84 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding that the plaintiff
who alleged “regarded as” disability did not allege that the employer “perceived him
as unable ‘to do the manual tasks central to most people’s lives’”).
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The Eighth Circuit’s reasoning significantly ups the ante for
proving disability claims. The plaintiff attempted to show that his
lifting impairment did in fact affect his activities of daily living
because he could no longer mow his lawn, drive his manual211
transmission car, or pick up laundry baskets.
Because there was
evidence the plaintiff could do other daily tasks such as picking up
around the house, washing dishes, and some laundry, however, the
Eighth Circuit found that he failed to show he had a substantial
212
limitation on a set of activities central to daily living.
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit rejected a plaintiff’s lifting disability
claim, despite evidence showing she could lift nothing over five or
ten pounds, because the doctor’s report outlining that limitation
213
spoke only to work-related activities.
The court reasoned that
“[e]ven if [the plaintiff] was unable to lift more than 5 or 10 lbs., she
has not presented any evidence to show that the inability to lift this
amount substantially limits her ability to lift anything else she
214
requires in her daily life outside work.” Earlier in its decision, the
court acknowledged that specific comparative evidence was not
required and that common sense and life experience are a sufficient
215
basis for the fact finder to draw a conclusion. Apparently, however,
common sense and life experience would not be a sufficient basis for
the fact finder to infer how such a significant restriction would
impact at-home as well as at-work activities.
Other courts have used Toyota to suggest that plaintiffs cannot
prevail by presenting lifting weight restrictions, but rather must
address which discrete tasks of daily life the restriction prevents them
216
from performing.
One district court, in fact, suggested that a
211. Nuzum, 432 F.3d at 847.
212. Id. Post-Nuzum, the Eighth Circuit also rejected a case in which the plaintiff
testified that he could only bend to eighty degrees because he could still do
household tasks as long as he avoided a lot of bending. Wood v. Crown Redi-Mix,
Inc., 339 F.3d 682, 685–86 (8th Cir. 2003).
213. Gerton v. Verizon S., Inc., 145 F. App’x 159, 166 (6th Cir. 2005). The
doctor’s report in Gerton was done by a company Verizon hired for the purpose of
evaluating employees with work related injuries. Id. at 161. The doctor reported
that the plaintiff should be “returned to work with restrictions of 5 pounds, onehanded duty and 10 minute stretch breaks every hour.” Id.
214. Id. at 166.
215. Id. at 165.
216. See Velarde v. Associated Reg’l & Univ. Pathologists, 61 F. App’x 627, 630–31
(10th Cir. 2003) (finding a twenty-five pound lifting limitation at work was not
enough to establish that the plaintiff was impaired from performing central daily
tasks); Harmon v. Sprint United Mgmt. Corp., 264 F. Supp. 2d 964, 969 (D. Kan.
2003) (finding that because the plaintiff’s doctors did not specifically limit his daily
activities, he did not establish a substantial limitation). The Seventh Circuit may
reflect a circuit in flux on whether the plaintiff is required to prove limitation in a
variety of tasks. In a 2002 case, the court relied on Toyota to hold that a plaintiff
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plaintiff could not prove a substantial limitation in lifting because he
could “clean his dishes, clean the yard, bathe his dog, do the
217
groceries, take out the garbage, and prepare his own meals.”
Another suggested that the plaintiff needed to present evidence of an
218
inability to “brush[] his teeth or otherwise car[e] for himself.” By
contrast, another district court found the plaintiff created a genuine
issue of material fact when she presented evidence of specific
limitations in her daily life, namely, cooking, cleaning, shopping,
219
driving, and other activities.
If Toyota indeed applies, these decisions are arguably consistent
with the standard the Court articulated. As Professor Samuel
Marcosson has noted, the Court in Toyota “frame[d] the inquiry not
in terms of what activities the individual cannot do or is substantially
220
limited in doing . . . but in terms of what the person can still do.”
failed to state a claim as a matter of law because his evidence addressed only a
doctor’s restriction that he be returned to work only if there was no lifting. Mack v.
Great Dane Trailers, 308 F.3d 776, 781–82 (7th Cir. 2002). According to that court,
[t]here may well be cases in which, because of the nature of the impairment,
one could, from the work-restriction alone, infer a broader limitation on a
major life activity. An inability to lift even a pencil on the job might suggest
an inability to lift a toothbrush, for example, or to otherwise care for
oneself—or at least might support an inference that the employer believed
the employee was so limited. But the work restriction in this case was not
nearly of that nature, and instead fits neatly into the sort of occupationspecific limitation at issue in Toyota.
Id. at 781; see Moskerc v. Am. Air Lines, Inc., No. 02 C 710, 2004 WL 1354521, at *3
(N.D. Ill. May 11, 2004) (citing the central functions discussion in Mack, 380 F.3d at
781, for the proposition that the ADA was intended to limit coverage to individuals
“that cannot find other productive work because the impairment is so limiting in his
life”); Gilbert v. Indianapolis Pub. Sch. Dep’t of Transp., No. IP 00-1799-C-T/K, 2002
WL 31968235, at *5 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 5, 2002) (suggesting Mack may require applying
Toyota’s daily tasks analysis to working claims as well). Subsequently, in a walking
disability case, a different panel found Toyota limited to performance of manual
tasks:
The ability of a person who is wheelchair-bound to wash his face or pick up
around the house does not indicate that he is not disabled under the ADA,
and it would not relieve his employer of the obligation to install a ramp or
reasonably accommodate his limitations in other ways.
EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (Keane II), 417 F.3d 789, 801 (7th Cir. 2005).
Whether the reasoning in Keane II supersedes that in Mack, or whether the Seventh
Circuit will apply disparate standards to walking and lifting, remains to be seen.
217. Soler v. Tyco Elecs., Inc., 268 F. Supp. 2d 97, 107 (D.P.R. 2003).
218. Moskerc, 2004 WL 1354521, at *4.
219. EEOC v. Valu Merchs. Co., No. 01-2224, 2002 WL 1932533, at *6 (D. Kan.
Aug. 9, 2002). Even when there is evidence these tasks are limited or even totally
foreclosed, however, at least one court has suggested that if the plaintiff can get
someone else to do them (in that case, his wife), the plaintiff is not substantially
limited in a major life activity. See Verhoff v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., No.
3:05CV7277, 2006 WL 3304179, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 13, 2006). Verhoff raises an
interesting question about what should be considered a mitigating measure,
discussion of which is beyond the scope of this Article.
220. Marcosson, supra note 67, at 375.
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But Toyota probably does not apply, at least the way the courts are
using it. While the Supreme Court in Toyota likely intended to state a
general standard for identifying major life activities when it defined
221
them as tasks “central to daily living,” there is no indication the
Court intended that case’s particular functional analysis to extend
beyond the performance of manual tasks. In other words, the Court
was not announcing a toothbrushing inability threshold for
substantiality in all ADA cases.
This is revealed by reading Toyota as a whole. The plaintiff alleged
not only that she was substantially limited in performing manual
tasks, but also in the separate activities of housework, gardening,
222
playing with her children, lifting, and working.
After the district
court granted the employer summary judgment on all her claims, she
223
appealed only manual tasks, lifting, and working.
The court of
appeals granted the plaintiff partial summary judgment on the
manual tasks claim, and side-stepped addressing any of her other
224
claims. The Supreme Court explicitly stated it was considering only
the manual tasks claim, the remainder of her claims being preserved
225
by her appeal in the court below.
Accordingly, the case presented manual tasks, working, and lifting
as separate major life activities, and the Court took pains to note that
it was articulating a standard only for “the specific major life activity
226
of performing manual tasks.”
In fact, a close reading of Toyota
shows that the Court’s main concern was the possibility that a plaintiff
could use manual tasks to circumvent the standards the Court
previously articulated for working.
Both “manual tasks” and working are classes of tasks rather than
discrete tasks in and of themselves like other activities identified in
227
the regulations (such as breathing, seeing, walking).
In Sutton v.
228
United Air Lines, Inc., the Court interpreted working to require that
plaintiffs show that they are “unable to work in a broad class of

221. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002).
222. Id. at 190.
223. Id. at 191.
224. Id. at 192.
225. Id. at 192–93.
226. Id. at 196.
227. Another class of tasks example in the regulations would be caring for oneself.
See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2007); see also Reg’l Econ. Cmty. Action Program, Inc. v.
City of Middletown, 294 F.3d 35, 47 (2d Cir. 2002) (defining caring for oneself to
“encompass[] normal activities of daily living; including feeding oneself, driving,
grooming, and cleaning home”).
228. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
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jobs” or a “broad range of jobs,’ rather than a specific job.” The
court of appeals in Toyota adopted a similar class-based analysis for
manual tasks (i.e., whether the plaintiff was limited in “a ‘class’ of
231
manual activities affecting the ability to perform tasks at work”).
The Supreme Court in Toyota found this “circumvented” Sutton,
reasoning that “Sutton’s restriction on claims of disability based on a
substantial limitation in working [would] be rendered meaningless
because an inability to perform a specific job always can be recast as
an inability to perform a ‘class’ of tasks associated with that specific
232
job.” Further, and “[e]ven more critically, the manual tasks unique
to any particular job are not necessarily important parts of most
people’s lives. As a result, occupation-specific tasks may have only
233
limited relevance to the manual task inquiry.”
Therefore, Toyota rejects reliance on occupation-specific tasks to
establish substantial limitation only to the extent that those tasks do
not mirror non-working tasks. In daily life, individuals rarely perform
the kinds of manual tasks that the plaintiff in Toyota was restricted
from performing—repetitive use of hands and arms lifted above the
shoulders. That is much less true for lifting. There may be some
idiosyncratic lifting-related movements that might not be reflected in
234
daily living, and courts may have a point about the insufficiency of
restrictions in those idiosyncratic cases. Basic lifting in itself is
generally the same, however, whether performed at home or at
235
work. The equivalency can be seen in this First Circuit observation:
229. Id. at 491. The EEOC regulations use slightly different language, requiring
significant restriction in a “class of jobs,” not a “broad class of jobs.” 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(j)(3)(i).
230. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 200 (quoting Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S.
471, 492 (1999)); see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i).
231. See Williams v. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc., 224 F.3d 840, 843 (6th Cir.
2000), rev’d, 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
232. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 200-01.
233. Id. at 201.
234. See, e.g., Pryor v. Trane Co., 138 F.3d 1024, 1026–27 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding
against a plaintiff who could not lift from shoulder overhead, whose push and pull
ability was limited, and whose doctor testified that “her activities of daily living are
100%”); Dutcher v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 53 F.3d 723, 726 & n.11 (5th Cir. 1995)
(affirming a judgment against a plaintiff who could not do heavy lifting, repetitive
rotational movements, had trouble picking up little things from the floor, holding
things real high or real tight for long periods of time, and turning a car’s ignition).
But see Ward v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1225 (D.N.M. 2001)
(finding plaintiff’s restriction from all repetitive or greater than two-pound overhead
lifting absolute and therefore substantially limiting on its face).
235. See Frix v. Fla. Tile Indus., Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1027, 1034 (N.D. Ga. 1997)
(finding that inability to lift more than twenty-five pounds disqualified the plaintiff
from a class of jobs involving medium and heavy work because the lifting was not
idiosyncratic to his job; it was a restriction on lifting any object over twenty-five
pounds).
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“Whether lifting pen to paper or glass to mouth, lifting is an integral
236
part of everyday life.”
For example, work-related lifting that involves lifting items from
ground level to place them on shelving has a parallel in the home237
related lifting of a small child or a large bag of dog food.
Other
groceries, laundry, household furniture, and equipment are also
items lifted in the same fashion as objects weighing similar amounts
at work, as a matter of common sense. While lifting very heavy items
(fifty pounds or more) arguably might not be common in daily life,
lifting twenty to twenty-five pound items would certainly seem to be,
238
as demonstrated by the foregoing list.
Recognizing the
substantiality of these lifting restrictions would not present the same
end-run around the major life activity of working. The individual
may have more opportunities to engage in lifting in the workplace
and thereby experience difficulties more often at work than at home,
but the significance of the activity is the touchstone, not where and
239
when it is conducted.
Lifting claims have nonetheless been rejected, even in cases with
restrictions as severe as five-to-ten pounds, merely because the
plaintiff demonstrated her restriction in the context of her work
activity and did not, for whatever reason, go into detail about
240
everyday activities. This makes no more sense than requiring that,
in order to state an ADA claim of disability, individuals using
wheelchairs must establish that they have as much difficulty getting
241
around their own houses as they do their workplaces.
Further, it
raises the question whether individuals who use wheelchairs would
236. Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Serv., Inc., 283 F.3d 11, 21 (1st Cir. 2002).
237. See Whitfield v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 2d 434, 439 (D. Del. 1999)
(describing the nature of the plaintiff’s twenty-pound lifting restriction “evident
when one considers that 20 pounds amounts to a large bag of dog food or a small
child”).
238. See id.; see also Guidance Letter, supra note 183 (noting that “the average
person in the general population can lift fifteen pounds with little or no difficulty”).
239. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 638 (1998). In Bragdon, the Court had
to decide whether reproduction was a major life activity under the ADA. Id. The
Court reasoned that in order to determine whether an activity is “major,” the activity
must be evaluated based on its significance. Id. The Court rejected the petitioner’s
argument that an activity had to fall in the public, economic, or daily dimension in
order to be considered major. Id.
240. See Gerton v. Verizon S., Inc., 145 F. App’x 159, 166 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding
that even if the plaintiff “was unable to lift more than 5 or 10 lbs., she has not
presented any evidence to show that the inability to lift this amount substantially
limits her ability to lift anything else she requires in her daily life outside work”).
241. See EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (Keane II), 417 F.3d 789, 801 (7th Cir.
2005) (noting that an employer is not off the hook for accommodating an employee
who uses a wheelchair simply because that employee is able to perform various
activities at home).
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fail to prove substantial limitation if they did not show they cannot do
242
The lower
basic household chores and personal hygiene tasks.
courts’ reasoning makes “central to daily living” a homogenous,
catch-all standard applicable to all determinations of disability.
“Central to daily living” defines the major life activity itself, not the
243
substantiality of the limitation. If lifting is recognized as a major life
244
activity, it is by definition a task central to daily living. The question
then becomes, what is an average person’s lifting ability and does the
plaintiff’s ability vary significantly from that? Where the restrictions
manifest themselves most prominently is beside the point.
Individualized assessment is the appropriate approach, not ruling as a
matter of law that certain weight restrictions are not substantial, or
that work-related evidence of lifting restrictions cannot prove
substantial limitation because the evidence does not address tasks
central to daily living.
3.

Failing to recognize common sense and life experience of the fact finder as
the most appropriate judge of basic motor skill limitations
From the foregoing analysis, the following two rules can be
gleaned: (1) weight restrictions above some yet-undecided threshold
require comparative evidence of the average person’s lifting ability,
and (2) plaintiffs need specific proof of the impact of the restrictions
on the activities of daily living. Yet, lifting along with other basic
motor functions seems easily understood through common life
experience. Expert evidence may in some cases be needed to
establish the parameters of the limitation, but beyond that, it really
should not be necessary to develop expert evidence of the average
person’s ability or of how the limitation impacts specific tasks of daily
living if there is other evidence of impact.
That courts are applying per se rules rather than sending cases to
the jury should not come as a surprise. The judiciary has expressed
concern about the legion of back injury cases it believes to be out

242. Cf. Marcosson, supra note 67, at 377 (asserting that “when the major life
activity in which the plaintiff claims to be substantially limited is a single, discrete
activity[,] . . . there is no reason to examine unrelated activities the plaintiff can
perform without substantial limitation”).
243. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002)
(discussing major life activities as central to daily life and then explaining a
substantial limitation); see also supra notes 17–20 (explaining the Toyota standard).
244. As articulated in the Interpretive Guidance, major life activities by definition are
“basic activities” the average person in the general population can perform with little
or no difficulty. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2007).
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245

there. To some extent, the problem also lies with the way plaintiffs
present their cases. For example, in one case, the plaintiff’s doctor
246
pronounced the plaintiff’s “activities of daily living” to be “100%.”
In another, when asked, the plaintiff apparently could not come up
with more than golfing as something in his daily life that he was
247
restricted from doing because of his impairment.
In yet another,
the plaintiff presented only the categories of jobs she could perform
under the DOT (light and selected medium work) and asked the
court to “infer” significant limitation from that alone (i.e., without
248
explaining how it related to general capabilities). Two plaintiffs in
a case alleging lifting and standing limitations could testify only
vaguely that they could not sit in one place “too long” or lift
249
“anything heavy” or “very heavy.”
Other cases, however, reject claims with sufficient evidence to
trigger common sense evaluation of the plaintiff’s limitations. One
plaintiff testified that he could not mow his lawn and could not do
“normal little things” like picking up a laundry basket and working
250
on his and his sons’ cars, but the court discounted that testimony
because it did not demonstrate limitation on tasks the court deemed
251
central enough. Similarly, another case found insufficient evidence
regarding a plaintiff who was subject to a company doctor’s order not
245. See Mays v. Principi, 301 F.3d 866, 869 (7th Cir. 2002) (“The number of
Americans restricted by back problems to light work is legion. They are not
disabled.”). The Seventh Circuit has raised similar concerns in non-lifting cases
where the plaintiff’s limitations stem from back injuries. For example, that court
rejected a claim by a plaintiff who could not stand for more than thirty-to-forty
minutes without having to sit or lie down, due to a spinal injury, reasoning that “all
persons impaired by virtue of common afflictions cannot be disabled.” Williams v.
Excel Foundry & Mach., Inc., 489 F.3d 309, 311 (7th Cir. 2007).
246. Pryor v. Trane Co., 138 F.3d 1024, 1027 (5th Cir. 1998).
247. Moskerc v. Am. Air Lines, Inc., No. 02 C 710, 2004 WL 1354521, at *4 (N.D.
Ill. May 11, 2004).
248. Gibbs v. St. Anthony Hosp., No. 96-6063, 1997 WL 57156, at *2 (10th Cir.
Feb. 12, 1997).
249. Colwell v. Suffolk County Police Dep’t, 158 F.3d 635, 644 (2d Cir. 1998).
Along analogous lines, a plaintiff in a walking case apparently did not clean up an
inconsistency between two statements by his doctor, one that he could walk only one
block without rest and another that he could jog “for only fifteen minutes.” Penny v.
United Parcel Serv., 128 F.3d 408, 416 (6th Cir. 1997). Another plaintiff who
claimed a walking disability failed to convince a court that noted that the plaintiff
had not obtained a handicapped parking permit. See Wood v. Crown Redi-Mix, Inc.,
339 F.3d 682, 685 (8th Cir. 2003) (acknowledging the plaintiff’s ability to walk was
limited, but finding that requiring rest after a quarter-mile walk did not demonstrate
a severe walking restriction).
250. Nuzum v. Ozark Auto. Distrib., Inc., 432 F.3d 839, 841–42 (8th Cir. 2005).
251. Id. at 847. The Eighth Circuit requires the plaintiff’s limitation be on a set of
activities central to daily living, which the court apparently views as “helping out
around the house, doing dishes, tidying up, and doing laundry.” See id. (rejecting
that mowing the lawn and driving a manual transmission car are central activities to
daily living).
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to lift more than ten pounds, not to use her right hand, and to take a
252
five-to-ten minute break every hour until cleared by that doctor.
The court refused to assume a five-to-ten pound lifting restriction
would affect any activities outside of the workplace despite the extent
253
that the limitation speaks for itself.
These cases do not follow the general ADA summary judgment
standard that requires the plaintiff to present “some evidence” of the
254
substantiality of his impairment.
As one court put it, “some
evidence” requires only “enough [evidence] about [the] disability so
the fact finder is not left speculating about how substantial [the]
255
limitations really are compared to the ‘average person.’”
That
standard would not require comparative evidence in the sense of an
expert who describes average lifting ability and then compares the
plaintiff’s ability to that average. Any such expert testimony would
not add much that is not already understood by the fact finder.
Rather, “some evidence” in this context should be understood to
mean evidence of the scope of the lifting restriction as experienced
by the plaintiff. This is in effect the standard articulated by the
256
Supreme Court in Kirkingburg.
252. Gerton v. Verizon S., Inc., 145 F. App’x 159, 161, 165–68 (6th Cir. 2005).
The plaintiff in Gerton asked the court to infer that because of the extent of the
limitations imposed by the company doctor, she would be also be unable to perform
any lifting activities in her daily life outside of work. Id. at 165. The court refused to
do so, apparently because the medical records did not explicitly show that she had
been asked to demonstrate her lifting ability. See id. at 165–66 (stating that the
plaintiff provided no evidence that she was unable to care for herself).
253. Id. at 166–67. The plaintiff in Gerton may well have thought, given the nature
of her restrictions, it was unnecessary to develop detailed evidence of what tasks she
could and could not do.
254. See Duncan v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 240 F.3d 1110, 1115–16 (D.C.
Cir. 2001) (concluding in a working disability case that the plaintiff has “to produce
some evidence of the number and types of jobs in the local employment market”);
Davidson v. Midelfort Clinic, Ltd., 133 F.3d 499, 507 (7th Cir. 1998) (reasoning in a
working disability case that the evidentiary burden is “not an onerous requirement,
but it does require at least some evidence from which one might infer that Davidson
faced ‘significant restrictions’ in her ability” to work); Gallegos v. Swift & Co., 237
F.R.D. 633, 649 (D. Colo. 2006) (requiring in a lifting disability case that there be
“some evidence of a substantial impairment in lifting”); Almond v. Westchester
County Dep’t. of Corr., 425 F. Supp. 2d 394, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (requiring in a
“regarded as” case that plaintiff “introduce some evidence tending to establish . . .
the perceived impairment would limit [the] plaintiff in the performance of some
major life activity”); see also Witt v. Nw. Aluminum Co., 177 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1131
(D. Ore. 2001) (interpreting the ADA in a walking disability case to require plaintiffs
to produce only “minimal evidence” to withstand a summary judgment motion).
255. Huizenga v. Elkay Mfg., No. 99 C 50287, 2001 WL 640973, at *6 (N.D. Ill.
June 5, 2001).
256. See Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 567 (1999) (stating that
persons claiming ADA protection must “prove a disability by offering evidence that
the extent of the limitation in terms of their own experience . . . is substantial”); see
also supra notes 53–56 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s evidentiary
requirement for substantial limitation).
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In other words, to prove substantial limitation, the plaintiff must
257
A doctor’s
testify to the limitations she personally experiences.
testimony may clarify the medical basis of the impairment and, for
less understood physical or mental impairments, explain how the
258
impairment affects the plaintiff’s abilities.
If the fact finder is
permitted to use common sense and life experience, the foregoing
would be sufficient evidence on which to judge whether the
limitation is substantial. Following that standard, the testimony of
one plaintiff who could not mow his lawn or lift a laundry basket and
that of another plaintiff who was precluded from lifting more than
ten pounds or using her right hand provided “some evidence” of
their limitations. That evidence was certainly enough for a jury to
judge on common sense and life experience whether, as a whole,
they added up to a substantial limitation as compared to average
human experience.
Here is where the failure to distinguish between work and lifting in
major life activity analysis has the most significance. According to the
Title I regulations, determining the degree of limitation on the major
life activity of working requires comparison to a cohort, a person of
259
similar skills, training, and experience.
The extent of job
opportunities within the plaintiff’s cohort and the extent to which his
impairment impacts those opportunities may not be something of
common understanding. For example, how many jobs require lifting
more than twenty-five pounds? What is the relationship between jobs
with lifting demands and the skills, training, and experience of the
plaintiff? Vocational experts or others who can speak specifically to
job abilities and job opportunities for the plaintiff and his cohorts
260
might be needed, depending on the circumstances of the case. By
257. More than identification of the alleged impairment is required; there must
also be evidence of how the impairment actually affects the plaintiff. See Harmon v.
Sprint United Mgmt. Corp., 264 F. Supp. 2d 964, 969 (D. Kan. 2003) (finding that
the plaintiff apparently failed to present any evidence of “the nature, severity, or
duration of his impairments”).
258. While most disability cases will involve impairments with limitations that will
be readily understood, there is the possibility that some might require additional
medical understanding beyond that of the average layperson. For example, consider
some diseases of the kidneys that impair the major life activity of eliminating bodily
waste. In these cases, the physician might also be required to testify about how the
impairment affects the plaintiff’s major life activity. For more discussion of this
point, see infra notes 305–306 and accompanying text.
259. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (2007) (directing comparison to “the average
person having comparable training, skills, and abilities”).
260. Even in working disability claims, however, vocational experts are not
required. See Duncan v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 240 F.3d 1110, 1115–17
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (reasoning that while the ADA requires the plaintiff to produce
some evidence of the number and type of jobs from which he is excluded because of
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contrast, determining the degree of limitation on the major life
activity of a basic motor skill is not subject to this same need for
cohort evidence.
Ideally, when proving a lifting disability, the plaintiff would speak
261
to both work and home limitations. When courts reject ADA claims
because the evidence of the restriction comes from workplace
activities, this suggests that they believe the restrictions are purely
contextual, that these plaintiffs go home at night and their
restrictions disappear. These courts envision the ADA plaintiff as
someone who is so impaired as to have an exceptionally diminished
quality of life across the board.
But the ADA does not require that plaintiffs have an exceptionally
limited quality of life, only that a particular impairment substantially
262
limits a particular major life activity.
If the average person can
perform a basic motor skill without limitation, a person who has
restrictions on that motor skill should be able to show substantial
limitation regardless of where the restriction has its most impact,
work or home. The common-sense and life-experience standard best
reflects the socially influenced nature of what is substantial. Juries
have sufficient understanding of basic motor skills to define whether
263
the limitation’s impact is substantial or trivial.
This is not just a question that goes merely to the debate over the
standard for finding an impairment substantial. That debate has in
itself largely been resolved in favor of requiring demanding
standards. Here, courts are asserting an evidentiary standard that
her impairment, such evidence could be based on the plaintiff’s own job search
experience and need not come from vocational experts).
261. See EEOC v. Valu Merchs., Co., No. 01-2224, 2002 WL 1932533, at *6 (D. Kan.
Aug. 9, 2002) (applying the Toyota daily tasks analysis, the court found that the
plaintiff created an issue of fact where she presented evidence of “specific limitations
on her day-to-day activities,” which included such things as cooking, cleaning,
shopping for groceries, driving, child care, dressing herself, and personal hygiene).
262. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 641 (1998) (reasoning that “[w]hen
significant limitations result from the impairment, the definition is met even if the
difficulties are not insurmountable”). In Bragdon, the Court accepted the plaintiff’s
argument that an eight percent chance of transmitting HIV to a fetus during
pregnancy could be a substantial limitation on a woman’s major life activity of
reproduction. Id. at 640.
263. Sitting is another activity that illustrates the real issue is not comparative
evidence. Office jobs require long hours of sitting. Home life, however, may allow
for more movement, more choice of resting position. As a matter of common sense
and life experience, a jury would know on average that a person should be able to sit
in an office chair for an eight hour-a-day job without significant pain and difficulty.
The jury needs evidence of how much pain and difficulty the plaintiff experiences,
but in most cases, it does not need comparative evidence to tell it how that pain and
difficulty compares to the average. A jury can reasonably evaluate the claim without
it, and without requiring that the plaintiff also prove the extent to which the sitting
impairment affects the plaintiff’s home life.
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stands in the plaintiff’s way—the requirement to provide certain types
of evidence in order to prove limitation. Because this is a question of
evidence, it might offer plaintiffs an opportunity. Plaintiffs may get
past summary judgment if they present the comparative and daily task
evidence that courts are saying they must present. This raises,
however, a new set of questions. Is the kind of comparative evidence
courts seem to be demanding available to plaintiffs? Is it any more
helpful than jury common sense and life experience? The next Part
addresses these questions.
III. THE INADEQUACY OF CURRENT MEDICAL AND VOCATIONAL
ASSESSMENTS TO MEET COURTS’ DEMANDS FOR COMPARATIVE
EVIDENCE
Courts have suggested that evidence of the plaintiff’s restrictions
“without more” is insufficient to establish a substantial limitation of a
264
What evidence would this “more” be? At least
major life activity.
one pair of commentators has suggested that all a plaintiff needs to
do is use her medical (or vocational) expert to opine on how the
plaintiff’s condition compares to the average person’s to create an
265
266
issue of fact to survive summary judgment. Is it that simple? This
Part considers the assessments medical and vocational experts
actually make and what they say about “average.”
Medical and vocational experts may be able to provide the kind of
comparison to “average” that courts suggest is lacking in some cases.
In others, the type of medical or vocational data that courts seem to
be insisting upon might not be available. The potential for Daubert
challenges to the evidence is therefore significant. Ultimately the

264. See Prickett v. Amoco Oil Co., 147 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1153 (D. Utah 2001)
(following the Tenth Circuit’s requirement of “comparative evidence as to the
general population’s lifting capabilities”); see also Olds v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.,
127 F. App’x 779, 782 (6th Cir. 2005) (concluding that “a weight restriction alone” is
not sufficient to establish substantial limitation).
265. See Van Detta & Gallipeau, supra note 15, at 522. Van Detta and Gallipeau
cite in support of their theory a federal district court opinion in which the plaintiff
submitted an affidavit from her physician stating that “90% of the general population
of similar sex and age would have better ability to stand and lift than [plaintiff].” Id.
(quoting Wheaton v. Ogden Newspapers, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1062 (N.D. Iowa
1999) (alteration in original).
266. In some cases, the “more” to which courts refer has been interpreted to mean
evidence of other impairments besides the ability to lift. See Napreljac v. Monarch
Mfg. Co., No. 4-02-CV-10075, 2003 WL 21976024, at *4 (S.D. Iowa May 27, 2003)
(suggesting that a lifting restriction alone was not sufficient, but was evidence of
disability when combined with restrictions against “repetitive pushing, repetitive
pulling, repetitive working above shoulder level and reaching above her head,
and . . . use [of] vibratory machinery”).
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expert evidence that is produced may not be better at gauging
substantial limitation than the fact finder’s common sense.
A. Medical Evaluation and Comparative Evidence
There are some well-known medical standards that incorporate
what might be called an “average” norm (or at least, a range of
normal from which to draw comparisons). Twenty/twenty vision,
normal blood pressure, and normal cholesterol levels are three that
come quickly to mind. As the Supreme Court’s ADA decisions make
clear, however, deviation from these norms alone does not prove
267
disability. Rather, the standards are at most a helpful starting point.
For some functions, such as the basic motor skills discussed in this
Article, there appear to be no general population norms. There is no
“average lifting capacity,” “average walking capacity,” or “average
sitting capacity.” Relevant medical evaluation of these functions
tends to be oriented to the task at hand, which most commonly is
returning a patient to a pre-existing level of functionality.
Medical evaluation is first and foremost about the medical needs of
the patient. However, a good part of medical practice involves
evaluating the patient’s ability to work. In fact, both medical and
vocational evaluations are heavily oriented toward assessing capacity
268
to work, whether in the pre-hire or return-to-work contexts.
For
example, a common evaluation process used in occupational and
rehabilitation medicine is the functional capacity evaluation (“FCE”).
As described by the American Occupational Therapy Association, an
FCE

267. See, e.g., Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 564–65 (1999)
(rejecting the lower court finding that the plaintiff with monocular vision was
substantially limited for purposes of the ADA merely because the manner in which
he sees is different); see also Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 521
(1999) (finding a plaintiff’s high blood pressure was not a disability because
medication controlled it).
268. See generally AM. MED. ASS’N, A PHYSICIAN’S GUIDE TO RETURN TO WORK (James
B. Talmage & J. Mark Melhorn eds., 2005) (defining capacity as embodying strength,
flexibility, and endurance and stating physicians most often deal with a subject’s
current ability); MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES IN VOCATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF
IMPAIRED WORKERS (Steven J. Scheer ed., 1990) (outlining vocational evaluations and
issues relating to subjects with learning disabilities, visual impairments, and hearing
impairments). Even when discussing the physician’s role in an ADA case, the
medical literature emphasizes return to work concerns. See AM. MED. ASS’N,
DISABILITY EVALUATION 70–71 (Stephen L. Demeter & Gunnar B.J. Andersson eds.,
2d ed. 2003) (1996) [hereinafter DISABILITY EVALUATION] (stating a physician must
provide substantial detail and quantification of a worker’s restrictions and later
confirm the manager’s interpretation of what indicated duties the worker cannot
safely perform).
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is an all-encompassing term to describe the physical assessment of
an individual's ability to perform work-related activity. . . . A welldesigned FCE should be comprehensive in terms of encompassing
the physical demands of work as defined by the U.S. Department of
Labor in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT.), have
standardized instructions and operational definitions, be practical
regarding space and length of time for administration, be objective
in minimizing examiner bias, and, most importantly, be reliable
269
and valid. . . .

In simplified terms, a typical FCE assesses the patient’s ability to
carry out various standardized physical tasks using measured weights
and distances, measures range of motion and peak force, and may
270
put the patient through a simulation of job tasks.
FCEs are
particularly common in cases involving musculoskeletal system
271
disorders. There are several different systems for conducting FCEs
272
FCE systems often include
sold by various commercial vendors.
both performance-based and self-report measures, but a “high value”
is placed on observation of the patient’s physical abilities by a trained
273
observer.
The patient is asked to exert maximum force, and the
resulting performance capacities are plotted onto a scale that mirrors
the DOT classifications for frequency of activity (never, occasionally,
274
frequently, and continuously).
The ability to use hands and
extremities, and the length of time activities such as sitting and
275
standing can be performed, may also be part of the assessment.
269. The Am. Occupational Therapy Ass’n, Inc., Functional Capacity Evaluation
Fact Sheet, http://www.aota.org/Consumers/WhatisOT/FactSheets/Conditions/35
117.aspx (last visited Nov. 1, 2007) (citations omitted).
270. Glenn S. Pransky & Patrick G. Dempsey, Practical Aspects of Functional Capacity
Evaluations, 14 J. OCCUPATIONAL REHAB. 217, 218 (2004).
271. Vincent Gouttebarge et al., Reliability and Validity of Functional Capacity
Evaluation Methods: A Systematic Review with Reference to Blankenship System, Ergos Work
Simulator, Ergo-Kit, and Isernhagen Work System, 77 INT’L ARCHIVES OCCUPATIONAL &
ENVTL. HEALTH 527, 528 (2004).
272. See id. at 271. Among those mentioned in the Goutteberg et al. study are the
Blackenship System, Ergo-Kit, the Ergos Work Simulator, and the Isernhagen Work
System. Id.
273. Douglas P. Gross & Michele C. Battié, Factors Influencing Results of Functional
Capacity Evaluations in Workers’ Compensation Claimants with Low Back Pain, 85 PHYSICAL
THERAPY 315, 316 (2005).
274. See Pransky & Dempsey, supra note 270, at 218, 220. Occasionally means
between one and thirty-three percent of the time, frequently means between thirtyfour and sixty-six percent of the time, and continuously means between sixty-seven
and one hundred percent of the time. Id. at 220. These categories track the Physical
Demand Strength Ratings used in the DOT, discussed in more detail earlier in this
Article. Supra notes 173–182 and accompanying text.
275. The Department of Labor has posted online the Work Capacity Evaluation
form it requires for Musculoskeletal Conditions, which evaluates these tasks. See U.S.
DEP’T OF LABOR, WORK CAPACITY EVALUATION MUSCULOSKELETAL CONDITIONS 1–2
(2001), http://www.dol.gov/esa/regs/compliance/owcp/OWCP-5c.pdf.
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Despite the claim that FCEs lead to “objective information” about
an individual’s functional abilities, the reliability of the various
systems used to measure functional capacity have been the subject of
276
debate in the professional literature.
The methodology each FCE
system uses to determine impairment has not been adequately
277
Because the data obtained in the testing depends for its
studied.
validity on the effort of the person being tested, which in turn
requires a judgment by the tester as to the sincerity of that effort, the
278
ability to produce accurate results has been questioned.
Even the
most heavily used FCE systems have serious issues with their
279
predictive ability.
The same is largely true of another prominent evaluation system,
the AMA Guides. Under the AMA Guides, physicians determine
“whole person” impairment ratings (“WPIR”) of the kind frequently
280
used in workers’ compensation systems.
The AMA Guides
(1) outline diagnostic criteria and procedures for various bodily
systems and structures, such as the cardiovascular system, the ear,
nose and throat, and the spine, among others; (2) suggest ranges of
impairment percentages based on the clinical findings; and
281
(3) provide example cases that fall within each of those ranges. A
“whole person impairment percentage” is defined as an “estimate
[of] the impact of the impairment on the individual’s ability to
282
perform the activities of daily living, excluding work.”
The AMA

276. See Gouttebarge et al., supra note 271, at 528 (arguing that the providers of
FCEs “do not supply enough evident information about the reliability and validity of
these FCEs”); Pransky & Dempsey, supra note 270, at 226 (commenting that the
acceptability of FCE use depends upon the application, such as whether for
adjudication or preplacement evaluation); see also Phyllis M. King et al., A Critical
Review of Functional Capacity Evaluations, 78 PHYSICAL THERAPY 852, 858 (1998) (“If an
FCE measurement does not have established reliability, test results could be different
with each administration.”).
277. Of the four systems mentioned in the Gouttebarge article, only one, the
Isernhagen Work System, had been studied for reliability and validity. See
Gouttebarge et al., supra note 271, at 535 (stating that all authors of studies on the
validity of this particular system mentioned the level of reliability); see also King et al,
supra note 276, at 858 (listing only two FCE systems as examined for reliability: (1)
when administered by different evaluators and (2) when administered upon the
same subject).
278. See Pransky & Dempsey, supra note 270, at 223–24 (emphasizing the
challenge in determining what a subject cannot do rather than what the subject will
not do).
279. See Gouttebarge et al., supra note 271, at 535–36; see also Pransky & Dempsey,
supra note 270, at 224 (observing that while accuracy of the return to work prediction
from an FCE “may be acceptable for a group of persons, the level of accuracy for an
individual may be low and unacceptable”).
280. AMA GUIDES, supra note 25, at 4–5.
281. See generally id.
282. Id. at 4.
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Guides list the activities of daily living (“ADL”) commonly measured
along with examples:
Activities of Daily Living Commonly Measured in Activities of
Daily Living (“ADL”) and Instrumental Activities of Daily Living
283
(“IADL”) Scales
Activity
Example
Self-care,
Urinating, defecating, brushing
personal hygiene
teeth, combing hair, bathing,
dressing oneself, eating
Communication
Writing, typing, seeing, hearing,
speaking
Physical activity
Standing, sitting, reclining,
walking, climbing stairs
Sensory function
Hearing, seeing, tactile feeling,
tasting, smelling
Nonspecialized
Grasping, lifting, tactile
hand activities
discrimination
Travel
Riding, driving, flying
Sexual function
Orgasm, ejaculation,
lubrication, erection
Sleep
Restful, nocturnal sleep pattern
The AMA Guides represent the AMA’s attempt to provide consistent
and reproducible evaluation outcomes for all types of medical
284
impairments. Just as with the FCEs, however, because each part of
the impairment assessment comes down to the clinical judgment of
the physician doing the evaluation, the meaningfulness of these
285
impairment ratings has been questioned.
Whichever system is at issue, there are serious issues about how well
the information obtained relates to the ADA question of substantial
limitation, at least in cases not involving the major life activity of
286
working. On the positive side, like the ADA, the AMA Guides
283. Id. tbl. 1-2.
284. Id. at 17 (theorizing that two physicians following the AMA Guides should
reach similar results and conclusions).
285. See James P. Robinson et al., Pain, Impairment, and Disability in the AMA
Guides, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 315, 315 (2004); Charles Richard O’Keefe, Jr., Note,
The AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment and Workers’
Compensation in Indiana, 27 IND. L. REV. 647, 679–81 (1994) (noting a critic arguing
that it would be an error to characterize the AMA Guides as objective and
highlighting normative decisions of physicians as to both organ–level and whole
person impairment).
286. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(2) (2000).
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explicitly distinguish between impairment and disability, noting that
“[t]he impairment evaluation, however, is only one aspect of
287
Also like the ADA, the AMA Guides
disability determination.”
288
define impairment physiologically or mentally, not functionally.
The AMA Guides also indicate that work-related impairment (as in the
ability to work itself) is not to be considered when determining a
289
person’s overall impairment.
Also, both the AMA Guides and typical FCE systems suggest that the
patient’s ADL are to be considered as part of the evaluation
290
process.
This would seem at first glance to overlap with Toyota’s
291
None of the evaluation systems is
daily activities standard.
designed, however, to measure daily activities as compared to
average. To be sure, the AMA Guides reference “normal” as a
touchstone for rating impairment, but the description of what is
meant by this reveals it is not the comparison courts seem to be
seeking in ADA cases:
Loss, loss of use, or derangement implies a change from a normal
or “preexisting” state. Normal is a range or zone representing
healthy functioning and varies with age, gender, and other factors
such as environmental conditions. For example, a normal heart
rate varies between a child and an adult and according to whether
a person is resting or exercising. Multiple factors need to be
considered when assessing whether a specific or overall function is

287. AMA GUIDES, supra note 25, at 8. The definition of disability in the AMA
Guides is not, however, the same as under the ADA. The AMA Guides defines
disability as “an alteration of an individual’s capacity to meet personal, social, or
occupational demands or statutory or regulatory requirements because of an
impairment.” Id.
288. Compare 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (2007) (defining physical impairment to
include “[a]ny physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or
anatomical loss affecting one or more . . . body systems” and mental impairment as
“[a]ny mental or psychological disorder”), with AMA GUIDES, supra note 25, at 2
(defining “impairment” as “a loss, loss of use, or derangement of any body part,
organ system, or organ function”).
289. AMA GUIDES, supra note 25, at 4. The AMA Guides provide that they are “not
intended to be used for direct estimates of work disability [and i]mpairment
percentages derived according to the Guides criteria do not measure work disability.”
Id. at 9. At the same time, however, the AMA Guides recognize that physicians in
appropriate cases may express opinions about disability. See id. at 14 (noting a
physician’s input is often essential for determining substantial limitation of a major
life activity or record of impairment under the ADA).
290. See id. at 4 tbl. I-2; King et al., supra note 276, at 859 (noting that as part of
the data gathering process for an FCE, the evaluator interviews the patient about
such things as “exercise programs, home and recreational activities, and level of
functioning in activities of daily living . . . to establish a baseline on the client and
reduce the risk of reinjury”).
291. See supra notes 199–202 and accompanying text (establishing a plaintiff under
the ADA must prove substantial impairment in all activities central for daily living).
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normal. A normal value can be defined from an individual or a
292
population perspective.

“Normal” under the AMA Guides can therefore be based on the
293
ADA cases
individual—what is normal for that particular person.
294
do not accept an individual-based norm.
The AMA Guide’s definition of “normal” also suggests that some
population-based norms could include age, gender and other
295
factors. By contrast, the ADA speaks only of “the average person in
296
The Interpretive Guidance explicitly notes
the general population.”
that “advanced age [and] physical or personality characteristics” are
297
not impairments.
The regulations nowhere suggest that “average”
can be based on some sliding demographic scale (even if, arguably,
that would make sense).
Further, the term “activities of daily living” is somewhat misleading
if looked at from an ADA perspective. In the FCE/return-to-work
assessment, the patient’s ability is tested in a clinical sense—i.e., the
patient is put through a series of tasks designed to measure the
298
patient’s lifting, walking, bending, and similar categories of ADLs.
The patient may be asked questions about other activities, but, as a
rehabilitation physician interviewed for this Article noted, the types
of home life activities that courts suggest ADA plaintiffs must address,
like difficulty carrying groceries, lifting laundry baskets, and cleaning
299
house, are not considered a typical part of the evaluation process.
Explicit evaluation of limits in those activities comes into play only
when there is a suspicion that the patient is “slipping into chronic
300
pain behaviors.”
292. AMA GUIDES, supra note 25, at 2.
293. See id. (articulating a normal value may be from an individual’s perspective).
294. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1) (2007) (defining a substantial limitation in
comparison to the average person within the general population).
295. AMA GUIDES, supra note 25, at 4; see DISABILITY EVALUATION, supra note 268, at
91 (noting that epidemiology is a population science but that legal adjudications
require individualized decisions).
296. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1); see Arnold v. Cook County Adult Prob. Dep’t, 13
A.D. Cases 244, 247 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (questioning relevance of a doctor’s report that
compared the plaintiff’s physical ability to push and pull to that of a man of similar
age).
297. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j).
298. See, e.g., King et al., supra note 276, at 860 (describing the types of functional
force assessments that are typically used to measure lifting capacity).
299. Interview with Terrance Glennon, M.D., Assistant Professor, Northwestern
University, Feinberg School of Medicine, Department of Physical Medicine and
Rehabilitation, in Carbondale, Ill. (July 26, 2006).
300. Id. Chronic pain syndrome is not well defined in the medical literature, but
involves some type of pain that has not resolved itself after a period of time, which
may be a set period (three or six months) or a more condition specific time (“the
reasonable expected healing time for the involved tissues”). See Manish K. Singh et
al., Chronic Pain Syndrome, http://www.emedicine.com/pmr/topic32.htm (last visited
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When an evaluation is being made for return-to-work purposes,
that evaluation focuses on the demands of the particular job and the
individual’s ability to meet those demands without the likelihood of
301
re-injury.
This in effect narrows the horizons of the assessment.
Courts may have some basis for being reluctant to accept physicianimposed activity restrictions, such as the lifting-weight restrictions,
because those restrictions might reflect a conservative treatment
regime more than the extent of actual limitation. The physician in
turn may be unwilling to commit to a more specific assessment of the
level of impairment, because medicine is still not doing a good job
302
(in the mind of doctors) with the science of impairment.
In obvious cases, where the impairment is so medically substantial
that there is little doubt that it also meets the ADA’s definition of
substantial (such as one case where the physician stated that “90% of
individuals of similar sex and age” have more lifting and walking
303
ability than the plaintiff), the physician might be willing to state a
specific opinion. Even acknowledging the physician’s expertise,
however, this type of opinion does not add much when the fact finder
can probably draw a similar conclusion about the severity of the
impairment from common sense.
There have been some cases where plaintiffs have included WPIRs
304
and FCEs in evidence presented to prove their ADA disability.
Perhaps there are indeed cases where the impairment ratings are
helpful to determine substantiality of limitation, such as cases where
the impairment and the major life activity are less commonly
understood.
Several circuits have, for example, recognized

Sept. 29, 2007). Part of treating chronic pain syndrome is interrupting the
reinforcement of pain behavior and modulation of the pain response. Id. Doctor
Glennon suggested that examining patients about specific daily activities like
carrying laundry baskets could in effect reinforce the patient engaging in chronic
pain behaviors. Interview with Terrance Glennon, supra note 299.
301. See, e.g., King et al., supra note 276, at 857 (describing a well-designed FCE).
302. Interview with Terrance Glennon, supra note 299; see DISABILITY EVALUATION,
supra note 268, at xiii-xiv (noting “the almost total lack of scientific research”
regarding impairment medicine).
303. See Wheaton v. Ogden Newspapers, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1063 (N.D.
Iowa 1999) (finding the plaintiff submitted sufficient evidence to withstand summary
judgment on the issue of substantial limitation with evidence her doctor imposed a
flat ten-pound lifting limitation and submitted an affidavit “opin[ing] that 90% of
the general population of similar sex and age” can stand and lift more than the
plaintiff could).
304. See, e.g., Webner v. Titan Distrib., Inc., 267 F.3d 828, 834 (8th Cir. 2001)
(noting that a doctor testified that the plaintiff had an eighteen-percent whole
person impairment rating as a result of his three back surgeries); Pryor v. Trane Co.,
138 F.3d 1024, 1026-27 (5th Cir. 1998) (relating that a plaintiff’s physical therapist
testified regarding the results of her functional capacity evaluations).
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305

“elimination of bodily waste” as a major life activity. In that context,
a doctor’s finding of a seventy-percent impairment of the whole
person because of a less common impairment such as “bilateral
306
polycystic renal disease” might help the jury assess the degree of the
plaintiff’s limitation. A seventy-percent impairment rating, however,
would probably strike a court as one of the “plain on its face” types of
307
cases.
It is doubtful that the medical profession wants to become
involved in debates about the significance of lesser percentages
(Forty percent? Thirty percent?), especially if asked to compare them
to “the average person in the general population,” in light of the
308
reservations medical science has regarding impairment medicine.
Accordingly, medicine might be able to measure average capacity
versus diminished capacity in such things as eyesight, heart function,
and so forth, but it is still rather poor in being able to measure how
impairment translates into actual disability. Moreover, the medical
focus is on treatment of the individual to gain as much function as
that individual is capable of gaining, not on comparison of that
individual to some type of average norm. To a physician, the average
person’s lifting or standing ability is a rather meaningless concept.
Perhaps this is one reason why there does not appear to have been
significant study of it.
B. Vocational Evaluation and Comparative Evidence
Many of the same issues arise regarding vocational evaluations as
309
they relate to major life activities other than working.
Vocational
evaluations

305. Heiko v. Colombo Sav. Bank, 434 F.3d 249, 251 (4th Cir. 2006); see Fiscus v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 385 F.3d 378, 384 (3d Cir. 2004); Kammueller v. Loomis, Fargo
& Co., 383 F.3d 779, 785 (8th Cir. 2004); see also Gilbert v. Frank, 949 F.2d 637, 641
(2d Cir. 1991) (suggesting a willingness to find persons who cannot eliminate bodily
wastes without aid of dialysis to have substantial limitation in their ability to care for
themselves).
306. AMA GUIDES, supra note 25, at 149.
307. See Wheaton, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 1063 (denying a motion for summary judgment
in part because of expert testimony stating that the plaintiff’s impairment restricted
him more than “90% of the general population”).
308. See DISABILITY EVALUATION, supra note 268, at xiii-xiv (noting the reservations
about impairment medicine and the need for further research in this area).
309. Among other things, in working disability cases, vocational experts can
provide labor market data that addresses the factors outlined in the regulations for
determining the substantiality of the limitation on working. See Carl Gann, Vocational
Experts in Employment Law Cases, 11 J. LEGAL ECON. 53, 59–60 (2002) (describing
vocational experts’ role in performing labor market surveys); see also 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(j)(3)(ii) (2007) (setting out demographic factors that may be considered
regarding substantial limitation of working).
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determin[e] the occupations a person can perform based upon an
analysis of foundational factors that are integrated into a
meaningful conclusion about employment potential. This factor
integration includes the person’s age, education, work experience
and training, marketable transferable skills, aptitudes, work
personality, physical and mental capacities, and access to the labor
310
market.

Vocational evaluation, by necessity, looks at how a person’s physical
condition affects her ability to work. The vocational evaluator (which
311
in ADA cases may be a rehabilitation counselor) is charged with
determining what job positions the individual can fill, with an eye
312
toward assisting the individual in finding appropriate employment.
The evaluator gives the individual a battery of tests, some pen and
313
paper, some requiring physical skills like manual dexterity.
The
evaluator also obtains other data from the individual, which can
314
include medical information. A report is then generated that gives
the individual undergoing evaluation information about appropriate
315
job titles or occupations, generally based on either the DOT, or
316
more recently, O*NET, both developed by the U.S. Department of
317
Labor.
The DOT uses more than eighty variables to evaluate over 12,000
types of jobs, with many of the variables focusing on physical and
318
functional skills and abilities.
As noted above, each occupation is
310. Gann, supra note 309, at 54 (citation omitted).
311. Gann suggests that “[t]he rehabilitation counselor is a unique choice as a
vocational expert in disability discrimination cases” because that counselor “is a
blend of the bodies of knowledge of occupational information and disability
information brought together by the profession of counseling.” Id. at 55.
312. See id. at 54–55 (noting the vocational expert’s use of a “vocational
evaluation” to determine employability of an individual and “feasible vocational
goals”).
313. Interview with Jack Musgrave, supra note 182.
314. Id.
315. DOT, supra note 23.
316. O*NET, supra note 24.
317. These reports have not been mandated by courts, even in working cases,
although they may be considered helpful. See Duncan v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit
Auth., 240 F.3d 1110, 1115–17 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (reasoning that evidence of the
number and type of jobs from which the plaintiff is excluded because of his
impairment can be based on the plaintiff’s own job search experience and need not
come from vocational experts); see also Mullins v. Crowell, 228 F.3d 1305, 1314–15
n.18 (11th Cir. 2000) (concluding that “expert vocational evidence, although
instructive, is not necessary” to prove substantial limitation in working).
318. See Jack Reeves, O*NET versus DOT—You Have to Admit This is Getting
Interesting, http://www.theworksuite.com/id13.html (last visited May 18, 2007)
(noting the number of variables and types of jobs listed in the DOT). The DOT is
detailed and complex, and a full explanation of it is beyond the scope of this Article.
The introduction to the DOT contains an overview that explains what comprises each
title. DOT, supra note 23, at xv-xxii. In addition, Appendix C to the DOT sets out the
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given a physical demands strength rating that categorizes the work
into sedentary, light, medium, heavy, and very heavy based on the
required exertion (“[e]xerting up to 20 pounds of force
319
occasionally,” “10 pounds of force constantly,” etc.).
By contrast,
320
The job
O*NET focuses more on cognitive-oriented work skills.
reports simply rank various variables on a 0–100 scale for each job
321
category.
Neither the DOT nor O*NET is particularly helpful under the
Toyota daily activities approach. To say a person is excluded from a
particular number of job titles says essentially nothing about how that
person’s impairment affects her ability to function outside the
322
Exclusion from job titles may have some relevance to
workplace.
the question of whether someone is substantially limited in the major
323
life activity of working, but is unlikely to be the “more” courts have
324
been demanding in some other major life activity cases.
various physical strength variables that are part of the occupational definitions. Id. at
1009–14.
In addition to issues regarding substantial impairment, the DOT has been used in
ADA litigation on the issue of the essential functions of a job. See Deane v. Pocono
Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 147 (3d Cir. 1998) (discussing the plaintiff’s vocational
expert’s reliance on the DOT job description for “general duty nurse” to argue that
the plaintiff was qualified for the position despite her lifting restrictions because
lifting was not an essential function of that job).
319. See DOT, supra note 23, at 1013.
320. Reeves, supra note 318.
321. O*Net job reports demonstrating the way the system rates variables can be
generated on-line. See, e.g., O*Net Online, Details Report for 51-4121.06 Welders,
Cutters, and Welder Fitters, http://online.onetcenter.org/link/details/51-4121.06
(last visited Nov. 2, 2007). O*net’s predecessor, the DOT, was last updated in 1991
and has therefore been criticized for being considerably out of date. Robert E.
Rains, Debating Disability Design: A Response, FED. LAW., May 2000, at 43. O*NET was
supposed to replace the DOT, as the labor market moves away from manual labor to
more cognitive-based labor, but has been deemed disappointing by those who use it
because what it produces is too general to be of much real use. Interview with Jack
Musgrave, supra note 182. O*NET has apparently proven disappointing to
vocational evaluators because it does not assess transferable job skills as well as the
DOT. Id. One commentator specifically noted how unhelpful O*NET is for
evaluators doing ADA work. Reeves, supra note 318. In addition, much of
contemporary service work retains a manual labor component, including work in the
retail, food service, and health care sectors. See, e.g., Galenbeck v. Newman &
Newman, Inc., No. 02-6278, 2004 WL 1088289, at *2 (D. Ore. May 14, 2004)
(describing the plaintiff, who worked at carry-out pizza store and had to lift twentyfive pound sacks of flour).
322. Expert reports that simply gather computer-generated information based on
DOT job titles stand less of a chance of being admissible in general. See Zarzycki v.
United Tech. Corp., 30 F. Supp. 2d 283, 291–92 (D. Conn. 1998) (rejecting an
expert’s report in a working disability case because his analysis was based solely on
the job titles he identified as matching the plaintiff’s skills and abilities and did not
say anything about the actual number of jobs within each of those titles).
323. An evaluator would be able to track transferable skills using the DOT, and
also address the degree of exclusion for a person of similar training, skills, and
abilities. Software such as OASYS generates reports that supply some local
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Courts may in fact be demonstrating a lack of understanding of the
labor market. Some courts have suggested that “heavy lifting” is
325
This leads to their refusal to find
beyond average capacity.
substantial limitation when plaintiffs present evidence that their
impairment excludes them from the very heavy, heavy, or even
326
medium heavy job categories.
However, labor categories are to a
large extent associated with education—such individuals with only a
limited education may in fact be substantially limited if they are
327
excluded from all but the sedentary and light job categories.
In the bigger picture, what this suggests is that courts and
medical/vocational professionals are speaking different languages
when they consider the ability to perform the tasks of daily living.
This is not to say that a physician or vocational specialist would not be
able to speak to some sense of average capacity. More, the question is
demographic info based on estimates using data gathered under the Workforce
Investment Act. Interview with Jack Musgrave, supra note 182; see Zarzycki, 30 F.
Supp. at 291 (describing expert’s process of using OASYS computer system to
generate his report).
324. Indeed, DOT exclusion has been treated as probative in some cases and
dismissed as non-probative in others. Compare Mondzelewski v. Pathmark Stores,
Inc., 162 F.3d 778, 785–86 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding expert’s report, which used the
DOT to estimate the types of jobs the plaintiff could do with his impairment, was
sufficient to meet the evidentiary burden for substantial limitation), with Zarzycki, 30
F. Supp. 2d at 292 (criticizing expert’s report for failing to consider the actual
number of jobs, only DOT titles that matched plaintiff’s abilities), and EEOC v.
Rockwell Int’l Corp., 60 F. Supp. 2d 791, 797-98 (N.D. Ill. 1999), aff’d, 243 F.3d 1012
(7th Cir. 2001) (drawing a parallel to Zarzycki to find vocational counselor’s expert
report inadmissible because it contained no evidence on the number of jobs in the
local market from which the claimants were excluded, instead analyzing job titles in
the DOT only). Rockwell International raises the further issue of whether an expert’s
report must meet the requirements for admissibility under Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). The court in Rockwell International held
both that the expert’s methodology was not scientifically reliable and that his
conclusions were not helpful to the trier of fact because of their generality. 60 F.
Supp. 2d at 797–98; see infra Part IV.C.
325. Buettner v. N. Okla. County Mental Health Ctr., 158 F. App’x 81, 87 (10th
Cir. 2005) (suggesting that restrictions on heavy lifting are “part of the human
condition”); Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Serv., Inc., 283 F.3d 11, 22 (1st Cir. 2002)
(suggesting that “a capacity to perform heavy lifting is not a trait shared by the
majority of the population”).
326. The DOT defines “medium work” as “[e]xerting 20 to 50 pounds of force
occasionally, and/or 10 to 25 pounds of force frequently, and/or greater than
negligible up to 10 pounds of force constantly to move objects.” DOT, supra note 23,
at 1013. The cases finding twenty-pound lifting restrictions insufficient as a matter of
law are, in effect, concluding that an exclusion from even medium work is not a
substantial limitation.
327. Interview with Jack Musgrave, supra note 182. As the rejected expert report
in Zarzycki pointed out, only 1965 out of 12,741 occupations listed in the DOT are
light or sedentary work. 30 F. Supp. 2d at 291; see TERRY L. BLACKWELL ET AL., THE
VOCATIONAL EXPERT UNDER SOCIAL SECURITY 16 (1992) (describing as “the most
difficult claimants” for vocational evaluation individuals “who have sufficient
impairment to restrict them to sedentary or light work, but who have no more than a
grammar school education and a work history of lower level, semi-skilled jobs”).
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whether insistence on expert testimony to establish comparison to
average ability is disingenuous given that expert knowledge on that
narrow topic may not be all that much more reliable than what
common understanding and experience provides. As the next Part
discusses, it also raises questions about whether the evidence would
meet reliability standards under the Federal Rules of Evidence.
C. Potential Daubert Issues in the Medical and Vocational Evidence of
“Average”
One potential problem plaintiffs will have if they seek to introduce
medical and vocational evidence of “average” is whether that
evidence can pass a challenge under Daubert v. Merrell Dow
328
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
Because courts are treating “average” as an
issue of medical science, the comparative evidence must have
329
sufficient scientific validity to be admissible under Daubert. It must
330
also assist the trier of fact in understanding a fact in issue. Both of
these requirements may prove to be difficult in some ADA claims,
especially if there is no science of “average” in regard to the
impairment at issue.
To be considered reliable, the Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert
requires scientific evidence to pass four general considerations:
1) whether the expert’s analysis derives from a scientific method
that can be or has been tested, 2) whether the expert’s
methodology has been the subject of peer review and testing,
3) the actual or potential rate of error in the expert’s methodology,
and 4) whether the relevant scientific community generally accepts
331
the expert’s methodology.

328. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
329. Id. at 592-93; see EEOC v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 243 F.3d 1012, 1015–18 (7th
Cir. 2001) (discussing and affirming the judgment of the district court after it
rejected an ADA vocational expert’s report under Daubert standards). A plaintiff
might argue that an expert’s opinion need not be based on scientific methodology,
but rather comes from “specialized knowledge,” which can be based on experience
in the field. See Humphreys v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., No. C 04-03808, 2006 WL
1867713, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 6, 2006) (allowing an expert to testify in a
discrimination case as to the defendant’s human resources practices based on his
long experience as a professor of organizational studies and working in the staffing
and employment industry). The nature of the evidence courts seem to be
demanding in the substantial limitation cases, however, most likely does not fall
under the “specialized knowledge” rubric. The issue is one of medical science and
will probably require plaintiffs to demonstrate scientific reliability under the general
Daubert standard.
330. FED. R. EVID. 702.
331. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94.
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These considerations are not exhaustive, and trial judges have
332
considerable leeway to determine whether the evidence is reliable.
A methodology does not have to be well established to survive a
333
Daubert challenge. For example, the Sixth Circuit upheld a district
court’s decision to allow an academic psychologist’s testimony about
how the plaintiff’s reading and comprehension skills compared to
“average,” despite acknowledging that the expert’s opinion was based
on a theoretical model that had not been empirically analyzed for
334
The
purposes of diagnosis and treatment of reading disorders.
expert had reviewed the results of a number of assessment tests the
plaintiff completed for a clinical psychologist and neuropsychologist
(which were not themselves challenged) and concluded that the data
335
revealed that the plaintiff performed within a normal range.
The
court rejected criticism of the expert’s opinion, reasoning that she
was not second-guessing the clinical diagnosis offered by the other
experts but rather determining “whether [the plaintiff’s] test results
were consistent with a substantial impairment in his reading
336
The science of testing produced a range of “average,” to
ability.”
which the expert made a comparison.
By contrast, however, another court rejected the testimony of a
physician who used a percentile formula to compare a plaintiff’s ten337
pound lifting restriction to the overall population.
The court in
that case concluded that the physician’s report provided no basis for
the percentile comparison: “[The expert] offers no data, no source

332. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999); see Daubert, 509 U.S.
at 595 (emphasizing flexibility and including other applicable evidentiary rules in a
judge’s analysis). Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, amended after Daubert,
applies to all expert testimony, not just scientific, but incorporates Daubert’s
elements:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the
testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the
product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied
the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
FED. R. EVID. 702; see Note, Reliable Evaluation of Expert Testimony, 116 HARV. L. REV.
2142, 2144 (2003) (noting that Rule 702 incorporates the standards articulated by
the Supreme Court).
333. See Kumho, 526 U.S. at 151 (noting that a claim by a scientific expert might
not have been subject to peer review because the particular issue might not have
raised scientific interest before the suit in question raised it).
334. Gonzales v. Nat’l Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 225 F.3d 620, 628 n.15 (6th Cir.
2000).
335. Id. at 628.
336. Id. at 628 n.15.
337. Gallegos v. Swift & Co., 237 F.R.D. 633, 640 (D. Colo. 2006).
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of information and no demographic evidence to back up his bald
338
assertions.”
This latter case illustrates the dilemma plaintiffs may face. They
must meet courts’ expectations about comparative evidence but when
they do offer expert evidence, it may end up being successfully
challenged as unreliable because there is no scientific basis for a
comparison to “average.”
Another Daubert issue is the requirement that the information
339
“assist the trier of fact.” The Court in Daubert suggested that this is
primarily a question of relevance, in the sense of whether the
340
testimony relates to an issue in the case.
But it also relates to
whether having an expert testify is superfluous because the matter is
341
one within common knowledge.
When courts in the ADA cases
dismiss claims because no comparative evidence was presented, they
are moving the question beyond what is helpful to what is required,
either explicitly or as a matter of practical reality, to survive summary
342
judgment.
Interpretation of specialized test results to determine whether
someone’s cognitive processing is substantially different than average
may in fact be a subject beyond common understanding. An opinion
on the substantiality of a lifting impairment compared to average
343
ability is probably unnecessary. Moreover, it raises concerns about
338. Id.
339. FED. R. EVID. 702.
340. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
341. Expert opinions that are within the layperson’s knowledge may be excluded.
Whether the situation is a proper one for the use of expert testimony is to be
determined on the basis of assisting the trier. “There is no more certain test
for determining when experts may be used than the common sense inquiry
whether the untrained layman would be qualified to determine intelligently
and to the best possible degree the particular issue without enlightenment
from those having a specialized understanding of the subject involved in the
dispute.”
FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note on 1972 proposed rules (quoting Mason
Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REV. 414, 418 (1952)).
342. This in essence makes “average person in the general population” the legal
equivalent of “unreasonably dangerous” in products liability defective design cases
and the standard of care in medical malpractice cases, both of which routinely
require expert testimony in order to get to a jury.
343. See Whitfield v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 2d 434, 439 (D. Del. 1999).
In Whitfield, the court found the following rather underwhelming expert testimony
sufficient to create an issue of fact for the jury on how the plaintiff’s abilities
compared to those of an average person:
Q: In your experience as a nurse, is an unimpaired person limited in their
ability to do repetitive reaching?
A: (Pause) I would have to say no.
Q: How about bending?
A: (Pause) Again, I would have to say no, but I would like to qualify it by
saying that one may not necessarily be impaired, but they may be limited
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the “cloak of authority” that comes from having an expert testify,
when the expert’s opinion is no more weighty (or scientific) than
344
common knowledge.
IV. WHAT ULTIMATELY IS COMMON-SENSE USE OF COMPARATIVE
EVIDENCE?
At this point, several different conclusions might be reached about
the evidentiary standard for proving substantial limitation. One is
that courts are insisting on additional expert testimony that isn’t
necessary for juries to be able to assess whether ADA’s legal standards
are met. Another is that plaintiffs’ attorneys need to pay more
attention to developing the record of impact on the daily lives of
their clients. Yet another is that the medical and vocational
rehabilitation fields could aid those who work with ADA claims by
developing systems that establish scientific benchmarks of “average”
abilities. The best conclusion is probably some form of all three.
Courts are demanding unnecessary additional evidence in some
ADA contexts. The lifting cases discussed in this Article illustrate the
because of poor muscle tone or, you know, something along those lines.
So—
Q: Well, is a normal healthy adult generally able to repetitively bend?
A: I would have to say yes.
Q: Is a normal healthy adult able to lift more than 20 pounds?
A: (Pause) I would have to say yes, depending on the person’s stamina.
Q: Are normally healthy adults generally able to stand in one place for
longer than half an hour?
A: (Pause) My professional opinion on that one is going to be no, not
without requiring a position change just because of circulatory compromises.
Q: Well, are normal healthy adults able to stand in one place in the way that
cashiers are required to stand in one place for longer than half an hour?
A: Yes.
Id.; cf. EEOC v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 243 F.3d 1012, 1021 (7th Cir. 2001) (Wood, J.,
dissenting) (“I see nothing to be gained by having vocational experts routinely
appear in ADA cases solely for the purpose of testifying that a broad range of jobs
require the ability to lift 30 pounds, or the ability to perform repetitive motions.”).
344. The case in which the court emphasized the plaintiff’s doctor’s opinion that
her lifting restriction was worse than “90% of the general population of similar sex
and age” demonstrates the way courts themselves attach a cloak of authority to an
expert opinion, even when that severe a restriction should be obvious enough that
expert testimony becomes a waste of judicial resources. See Wheaton v. Ogden
Newspapers, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1063 (N.D. Iowa 1999). The plaintiff in
Wheaton also testified to her limitations, and compared her lifting abilities to that of
average person. See id. at 1062–63. The court read Eighth Circuit precedent to
require “‘more’ evidence than merely her lifting restriction to generate a genuine
issue of material fact” regarding whether she was substantially limited, and the
doctor’s affidavit convinced the court that she met that requirement. Id.; cf. Richard
B. Katskee, Why it Mattered to Dover that Intelligent Design Isn’t Science, 5 FIRST AMEND. L.
REV. 112, 115 (2006) (noting the “the public’s scientific illiteracy (which leads most
of us, unreflectively, to regard any view dressed in the lab coat of pseudoscientific
terminology as wearing the cloak of scientific authority)”).
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courts’ tendency to eschew individualized assessment in favor of per se
rules, wrapped in the guise of plaintiffs’ failure to meet their
345
Although they recognize that some
evidentiary burden.
impairments are limiting on their face, they also fail to credit
evidence that is sufficient for the fact finder to judge whether the
impairment presents a substantial enough limitation.
The Supreme Court in Kirkingburg stated that the burden of
proving substantial limitation was not onerous and should be proven
346
by testimony about the plaintiff’s experience. What can be gleaned
from this is that the Court believed the fact finder could judge the
substantiality of a limitation from knowing how the impairment (in
that case, lessened visual acuity) affected the plaintiff. In other
words, the Court saw substantiality as a fact question centered on the
plaintiff and not on the science of “average.” Most people hearing
about another’s personal and medical experience with a physical or
mental impairment would be able to judge how it relates to average
347
human experience.
Therefore, insisting on additional “scientific”
evidence of average is unnecessary in many of these cases.
Courts should also stop being dismissive of the evidence of impact
on plaintiffs’ daily activities when offered to prove a limitation is
substantial. Whether an impairment is substantially limiting is not
the same question as whether an activity qualifies as a major life
activity. Toyota spoke of each alleged manual task having to be
central to daily living, individually or in the aggregate, because that is
348
the nature of “performing manual tasks.”
It is a class-based major

345. When the “on its face” standard was first used by courts in evaluating
substantiality questions, it probably meant only that identification of an impairment
is not in itself proof of a disability. In other words, “on its face” meant “alone.” That
is true, as far as it goes. The individualized assessment model of the ADA does
require determination of how an impairment impacts the particular plaintiff before
the court. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 483 (1999). As the cases
discussed earlier in this Article demonstrate, however, “on its face” has shifted
meaning at least for some courts to “as a matter of law.” The individualized
assessment has been replaced by a per se rule that lifting restrictions of twenty-five
pounds or more are not substantially limiting. See, e.g., Wheaton, 66 F. Supp. 2d at
1062 (noting such a per se rule in the Eighth Circuit).
346. Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 567 (1999).
347. The Fourth Circuit rejected a claim by a woman asserting she was
substantially limited in the major life activity of socializing with others by noting that
her avoiding certain co-workers “[did] not distinguish her from the general
population[,]” and that she failed to provide sufficient testimony about her own
experience to create a question of fact as to the substantiality of her alleged
limitations. Rohan v. Networks Presentations, L.L.C., 375 F.3d 266, 275–76 (4th Cir.
2004).
348. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002).
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life activity; if the individual task is not significant, the sum of the
349
tasks must be.
When discrete motor functions are at issue, the same analysis does
not apply. Impact evidence is offered in those cases not to prove
each such daily activity is a major life activity in and of itself, but
rather to meet Kirkingburg’s standard that the plaintiff must provide
350
evidence of his or her personal experience.
For a person with
restrictions on basic motor functions like lifting, walking, standing, et
cetera, difficulty doing activities such as lawn mowing, household
chores, driving, sewing, et cetera, is evidence of substantial impact
because these are all activities the average person without basic motor
function impairments can perform with little or no restriction. They
are what most people can do, to put it in the language of the
351
legislative history of the ADA.
The plaintiff need not be fully
restricted from these activities, just find them significantly more
352
difficult to do.
That said, plaintiffs’ counsel can also do a better job, based on the
reported cases, of developing the fact record. ADA plaintiffs’ counsel
would be wise to consider a suggestion made by Professor Michael
Selmi for employment law cases in general: “present evidence to
explain the nature of the discrimination at issue, and in presenting
353
the evidence . . . generally assume the court is hostile to the claim.”
Even if courts are too demanding of impact evidence, plaintiffs
should anticipate that judicial hostility and, when possible, articulate
with some degree of detail how the impairment affects daily activities.
A ten or even twenty-pound lifting restriction, for example, should
have some manifestation in a person’s home life. It strains credibility
when a plaintiff cannot articulate how an impairment of a basic
motor function actually affects him and has to rely on the mere fact
of physician imposed restrictions. Plaintiffs need to overcome the
apparent judicial belief that those limitations are mostly on paper.
Relatedly, the medical and vocational rehabilitation fields should
consider turning more attention to the dilemma ADA claimants face
with having to establish a comparison to “average.” Given that both

349. Id.
350. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. at 567.
351. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990).
352. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) (2007) (defining “substantially limits” to
include “[s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under
which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the
condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general
population can perform that same major life activity”).
353. Selmi, supra note 196, at 573.

2007]

COMPARATIVE EVIDENCE OR COMMON EXPERIENCE

477

the medical and vocational rehabilitation professions responded to
workers’ compensation and other disability compensation programs
by developing impairment rating systems (e.g., FCEs, the AMA
Guides), they should do the same for the issues raised by the ADA.
Use of ADA-specific FCE systems to demonstrate the many ways an
impairment impacts daily living may help avoid summary judgment
354
even under the current narrow construction of the ADA.
In final assessment, courts are not wholly incorrect to conclude
that some disabilities appear plain on their face and do not require
additional evidence to prove substantial limitation, whereas other
claims require more proof. Cases are being sent to juries, however,
only when the courts think it obvious that the plaintiff can prove
disability. In other cases, courts have been insisting on evidence that
is either unnecessary, unattainable, or both. Close cases should first
be recognized as such and second, be sent to the jury without falling
back on disingenuous reasons for dismissing them.
In and of itself, “average” is a problematic concept. Undoubtedly,
both individuals with disabilities and the medical and vocational
professionals who work with them have a certain amount of resistance
to the idea that there is an “average” person, because it suggests that
there is a “normal” person. The ADA treats individuals as individuals
355
based on their abilities, and not on some exclusionary norm.
Courts have, of course, translated this into a narrow definition of the
protected category, performing a gate-keeping role. The best judge
of whether the experiences of an individual are outside the norm,
however, is the jury. Jury common sense is preferable to judge-made
common sense when the issue is one of common experience.
CONCLUSION
The common sense and life experience of the fact finder is
typically the best judge of whether a limitation is substantial, at least
in cases in which the plaintiff presents individualized evidence of a
354. Employers have been encouraged to avoid “generic FCEs” when evaluating
existing employees’ physical and functional abilities, because the ADA requires that
such evaluations be job-related. See Pransky & Dempsey, supra note 270, at 225. On
the flip side, plaintiffs’ attorneys and their experts should be sensitive to the need to
demonstrate the impact on their client’s daily lives, not simply their generic
functioning.
355. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2000) (characterizing individuals with
disabilities as “a discrete and insular minority who have been faced with restrictions
and limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and
relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our society, based on
characteristics that are beyond [their] control . . . and resulting from stereotypic
assumptions not truly indicative of [their] individual ability”).
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physical or mental impairment. The demand made by some courts
for specific comparative evidence places an inappropriate evidentiary
burden on plaintiffs, even acknowledging a restrictive interpretation
of “substantially limits.” Plaintiffs, along with their medical and
vocational experts, nonetheless need to do a better job of
anticipating judicial hostility to ADA claims when they develop the
record of their limitations, and not assume that common sense will,
indeed, prevail.

